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i THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The Sixth Amendment, framed in an atmosphere of deep mistrust of a potentially 
oppressive government, broadly requires that defendants be provided seven fundamental 
procedural protections.  Over the course of the past five decades, the scope and meaning of 
these critical safeguards have undergone tremendous change, with series of expansive and 
restrictive readings.  Through this jurisprudential development, several provisions of the 
Sixth Amendment have been interpreted in a manner that contravenes the plain meaning of 
its text, rendering the Amendment far less protective of individual liberty. 
 
After developing a comprehensive historical account of the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, this Article provides a framework for understanding the origins of the 
textually-inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment, tracing them to the interplay 
between the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause.  In 
addition to discussing the effects of the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment through the 
Due Process clause, the Article analyses the Court’s doctrinal entanglement of these two 
clauses.  Then, in light of the Court’s recent landmark decisions disentangling the Sixth 
Amendment, this Article proposes alternate, textually consistent constructions for the 
various entanglements of the Sixth Amendment, ones that would be more faithful to the 
critical role of these safeguards in protecting individual liberty. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Bill of Rights, framed in an atmosphere of great mistrust of a potentially oppressive 
government,3 not only enunciate broad principles limiting the powers of the federal 
government, such as due process of law,4 but also include more particularized rules to 
safeguard individual liberty.  The Sixth Amendment, for example, guards against 
unjustified deprivations of life and liberty5 by mandating that the federal government 
provide seven specific procedural protections to all those accused of committing a crime.6 
 
Over the course of the two centuries since its ratification, but particularly during the last 
few decades, the scope and meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections 
have undergone significant development.  While the Warren Court era was marked by the 
incorporation of the Sixth Amendment and by largely expansive readings of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts adopted decidedly more restrictive readings 
of the Amendment.   
 
During the course of this jurisprudential development, the Court has adopted a number of 
constructions of the Sixth Amendment that plainly contravene its text and are less 
protective of individual liberty.  For example, contrary to textual mandate that defendants 
in “all” criminal prosecutions be provided the seven procedural protections, the Court has 
held that the rights to jury trial and counsel need to be provided only in a limited subset of 
criminal prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets.  Even the Court’s textually-
inconsistent expansive readings of the rights to public trial and compulsory process, 
extending the former to pre-trial proceedings and including in the latter a right to have 
witnesses testify, have ironically opened the door to textually-inconsistent restrictive 
readings of the Sixth Amendment.  
 
The textually-inconsistent, restrictive interpretations of the Sixth Amendment pose a 
significant problem irrespective of what theory of constitutional interpretation one ascribes 
too because constitutional text is a necessary beginning point.7  While text, including that 
                                                 
3 See George C. Thomas III, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights 
and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 157 (2001); Erik G. Luna, The Models of Criminal 
Procedure, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 389, 398 (1999); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 
100 Yale L.J. 1131 1140 (1991). 
4 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1533, 1556 (2008); Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. 
REV. 747, 769 (1991). 
5 See, e.g., Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (“The [jury trial] clause was clearly intended to 
protect the accused from oppression by the Government . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
6 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
7 This Article does not claim that the Sixth Amendment’s text provides the means to resolve all interpretive 
issues.  Indeed, as scholars have noted “[t]he text did not come with a user’s guide or a set of instructions for 
interpretation. As noted by Judge Richard Posner, “The Constitution does not say, ‘Read me broadly,’ or, 
‘Read me narrowly.”’”  Luna, supra Note 3, at 422 (citation omitted).  In fact, “[s]cholars generally agree 
that a number of tools are available to interpret the Constitution, including the text itself, original intent, 
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of the Sixth Amendment, is not always unambiguously clear, where it is, that plain 
meaning constitutes a minimal baseline in protection of individual liberty.8  Whatever one 
might think about the propriety of the Court’s finding that the Sixth Amendment provides 
greater protections of individual liberty than the text might seem to suggest, it is difficult to 
claim that the Sixth Amendment provides lesser protections of individual liberty than that 
evident from a plain reading of the text.   
 
The Court’s problematic textually-inconsistent restrictive readings of the Sixth 
Amendment can be traced to the interplay between the Sixth Amendment and the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause.  In some instances, the Court has entangled 
the two constitutional provisions in the process of incorporating the Sixth Amendment 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, leading the Court to adopt some 
textually-inconsistent restrictive readings arguably in order to mitigate the impact of 
incorporation on the states.  In other instances, the Court has entangled the two 
constitutional provisions by improperly locating expansive procedural protections in the 
rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving the same rights from the general 
principle of Due Process, ironically opening the door to possible restrictive reading of the 
Sixth Amendment in the future.  Finally, the Court has entangled the two constitutional 
provisions by improperly using Due Process interpretative methodologies to give meaning 
to the Sixth Amendment, leading to textually-inconsistent restrictive readings.   
 
In addition to providing a doctrinal framework for the textually-inconsistent restrictive 
readings of the Sixth Amendment, this Article proposes alternate, textually sound 
constructions in light of the recent noteworthy development in the Court’s criminal 
procedure jurisprudence.9  While commentators have celebrated or decried two landmark 
opinions – Apprendi v. New Jersey10 and Crawford v. Washington11 – and their progeny as 
having affected fundamental change in the Court’s sentencing and confrontation clause 
jurisprudence respectively, the Article suggests that these seminal decisions are more 
properly understood as being part of a common enterprise – the Court’s commitment to 
disentangle the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and to reclaim the textual core of the 
Sixth Amendment.   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
constitutional structure, judicial precedents, and contemporary values.”  Id. at 394.  The Article, however, 
does begin with the premise that the text is the proper starting point in constitutional interpretation.  See 
Akhil Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143, 1143 (1998); Laurence H. 
Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1223 (1995). 
8  This primacy of the plain meaning text is contingent on its being consistent with the history and purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment.  Where a plain reading of the text conflicts with the history or purposes of the 
Amendment, adopting a purely textual interpretation might be unwise.  See Akhil Reed Amar, The 
Constitution and Criminal Procedure: First Principles 153 (1997).  None of the textual readings of the Sixth 
Amendment offered in this Article are inconsistent with the purpose or history of the Sixth Amendment. 
9  This Article only addresses those instances of entanglement where there is a compelling textual alternative.  
There remain other entanglements not addressed here.  
10  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
11  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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*     *     * 
 
In Part I, the Article sets forth a historical account of the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence, highlighting the Court’s recent expansive and restrictive readings of the 
various procedural protections that have led to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment.  
In Part II, the Article discusses the two recent seminal developments in the Court’s 
criminal procedure jurisprudence that have entailed disentangling the Sixth Amendment 
from the Due Process Clause.  In Part III, this Article identifies the remaining textually-
inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment that can be traced to the Court’s 
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment and proposes alternate readings, ones that are more 
faithful to the text of the Sixth Amendment and more protective of individual liberty.12 
 
I.  THE PATH TRAVELLED: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE 
COURT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
 
The Sixth Amendment, proposed by James Madison in 1789 and ratified in 1791,13 
requires the federal government to provide seven specific procedural protections to all 
those it accuses of committing a crime: the right to a speedy trial; the right to a public trial; 
the right to a trial before an impartial jury drawn in a prescribed manner; the right to 
notice; the right of confrontation; the right to compulsory process; and the right to 
assistance of counsel.14   
 
Despite the broad reach of these procedural safeguards, for over a century after its 
ratification, there were relatively few Supreme Court cases of significance involving the 
Sixth Amendment.15  In fact, the only provision of the Sixth Amendment that the Court 
dealt with during this period was the right to a jury trial:  in a series of decisions towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Court circumscribed the scope of the right to a jury 
trial, finding that the right did not extend to the trial of petty crimes.16   
 
                                                 
12 While the Article suggests that various rights, such as the right to public pre-trial proceedings, have been 
improperly located in the Sixth Amendment, it does not advocate that these rights lack constitutional bases.  
On the contrary, these rights are properly located in the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L.J. 1807 
(1997) (arguing that some interpretative problems in the Court’s double jeopardy jurisprudence can be 
avoided by locating those rights in the Due Process clause); Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law: “Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1559 
(1996) (arguing for a robust reading of the Due Process clause).   
13 Penny J. White, “He Said,” “She Said,” and Issues of Life and Death: The Right to Confrontation at 
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 Regent U. L. Rev. 387, 397 n.46 (2007) (citation omitted). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
15 Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi's Domain, 2006 Sup. Ct. Rev. 297, 342 (2006). 
16 District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal 
v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). 
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The dearth of Sixth Amendment cases during this period is not surprising.  Since most 
crimes were prosecuted by states to whom the Bill of Rights did not apply,17 and since 
there was a significant limitation on a defendant’s ability to challenge a federal 
conviction,18 there was little occasion for the Court to interpret the mandates of the Sixth 
Amendment.  This was true even during the Reconstruction Era despite the enactment of a 
statute geared at expanding state defendants’ access to federal courts.19 
 
While the first few decades of the twentieth century witnessed a marked evolution in the 
Court’s willingness to apply Due Process limits on state criminal procedures and practices, 
this jurisprudential change did not involve the Sixth Amendment, whose provisions 
remained unincorporated.20  There were only two significant developments, both involving 
the right to counsel – the Court read the right to counsel expansively to include an 
obligation for the federal government to appoint counsel for indigent defendants21 and to 
include the requirement that the assistance provided by counsel be effective.22  
 
It was not until the Warren Court era that the Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
witnessed significant development.23  Perhaps most importantly, over the course of several 
years, the Court incorporated the various provisions of the Sixth Amendment,24 finding for 
                                                 
17 See Barron ex rel. Tiernan v. Mayor of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833).  There were also 
significant procedural hurdles preventing state court defendants from using collateral proceedings to appeal 
to the Supreme Court.  Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 465 (1963) (“[U]ntil 1867 (and with exceptions not relevant here) there 
was no federal habeas jurisdiction to inquire into detentions pursuant to state law.  Further, even after the act 
of 1867 established such a jurisdiction, the Supreme Court could make no pronouncements in cases of state 
detention because the Court's appellate jurisdiction under the act of 1867 was removed in 1868 and not 
reestablished until 1885.  Thus during the first century of the Constitution the Court had no occasion to deal 
with the scope of the habeas jurisdiction for state prisoners.”). 
18 Bator, supra Note 17, at 473 n.75 (“Until 1889 federal criminal cases were reviewable by the Supreme 
Court only when there was a division of opinion in the circuit court on a question of law.”) (citations 
omitted). 
19 Bator, supra Note 17, at 478-93; Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2337 
(1993) (“[O]ne of the most significant enactments of the Reconstruction era, the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, 
extended that jurisdiction to cases in which petitioners charged they were unlawfully detained by state 
officials. . . .  In the wake of Reconstruction, habeas helped shape the relations between the federal 
government and the states. . . .); id. at 2339 (“Still, as late as the notorious Leo Frank case, Frank v. Mangum, 
the Court repeated the confused boilerplate that had attached itself to the writ over the preceding century. . . 
[and] federal habeas was open only if the state court had exceeded its jurisdiction-if it had ceased to act as a 
court.”) (citation omitted). 
20 See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 2331, 2341 (1993). 
21 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). 
22 Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942).  This reading of the Sixth Amendment was reiterated 
by the Court in subsequent cases.  See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970). 
23 The Warren Court’s “criminal procedure revolution” can be seen as a reaction both to “pervasive 
legislative abdication of criminal procedure rulemaking” – for example, for more than two decades Congress 
failed to take any action to implement the Court’s decision requiring the appointment of counsel for indigent 
defendants – and to “disparate class and racial impact” of criminal prosecutions.  Klarman, supra Note 4 at 
764-67. 
24 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968) (jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) 
(compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 380 
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the most part that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause guaranteed defendants 
in state courts the same fundamental procedural protections guaranteed by the Framers to 
defendants in federal courts.25  Ironically, this process of incorporation, properly seen as an 
expansive reading of the Due Process clause as opposed to an expansive reading of the 
Sixth Amendment, provided the impetus for later restrictive readings of the Sixth 
Amendment.26  
 
The Court’s Sixth Amendment jurisprudence was also significantly affected by the Warren 
Court’s removal of the jurisprudential handcuffs that had been imposed on the federal 
courts’ ability to remedy constitutional violations through the great writ of habeas corpus.27  
The Court’s subsequent decision to subject constitutional violations – not violations of 
mere ordinances or rules or statutes, but violations of the Constitution – to harmless error 
analysis28 too had an important effect on the Sixth Amendment.29 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
U.S. 400 (1965) (confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel).  While the Court’s 
earlier opinions in In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) and Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948) do not make 
this clear, in later years the Court has seen them as having incorporated the Sixth Amendment’s rights to 
public trial and notice, respectively.  See Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).  See Donald A. Dripps, 
Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 635, 647 (1999) (“The Warren Court 
cases indeed worked a revolution in the administration of justice in the states.  The revolution, however, took 
the doctrinal form of incorporating the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
25  There have been only two exceptions to this “jot-for-jot” approach to incorporation.  First, despite the 
long-standing understanding that the right to a jury trial meant the right to a unanimous jury verdict,  Andres 
v. United States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948), the Court held that this unanimity requirement was not applicable 
to state prosecutions.  Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).  Similarly, the Court held that while a 
twelve-person jury was required in federal prosecutions, juries in state prosecutions could be composed of 
fewer than twelve persons.  Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).  In a series of subsequent decisions, the 
Court set forth the Due Process limitations on jury size and anonymity in state prosecutions.  In particular, 
the Court subsequently held that juries in state courts must be comprised of a minimum of six persons, 
Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978), and that non-unanimous verdicts in state prosecutions would be 
unconstitutional if they are the product of six-person juries.  Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979).  
Therefore, while both 9-3 and 5-1 jury verdicts are unconstitutional in federal prosecutions, only the latter are 
unconstitutional in state prosecutions. 
26 See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 117, 129 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court 
in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) “dilute[d] a federal guarantee in order to reconcile the logic of 
‘incorporation,’ the ‘jot-for-jot and case-for-case’ application of the federal right to the States, with the 
reality of federalism.”). 
27 See Stephen F. Smith, Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 
1066. 
28 Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (allowing courts to deny relief even if a defendant 
demonstrates a constitutional violation if the government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
violation did not affect the jury’s verdict). 
29 While the development of harmless error analysis might be viewed as a restrictive development from an ex 
post perspective insofar as it limits the universe of defendants who would be entitled to relief upon a showing 
of a constitutional violation, from an ex ante perspective it is arguably an expansive development.  This is 
because it makes more likely the possibility that courts will deem offending state practices to be 
unconstitutional – a court after all could find that a violation occurred, but need not worry that resources 
would be needlessly expended by mandating a re-trial of a clearly guilty defendant – which in turn enhances 
the prescriptive value of the Constitutional rule, making future compliance with that rule more likely.   
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In addition to these procedural developments affecting the Sixth Amendment, the Warren 
Court era was marked by expansive substantive readings of the Sixth Amendment.  For 
instance, the Court read the Confrontation Clause to prohibit the use, in a joint trial, of a 
non-testifying co-defendant’s confession notwithstanding the trial court’s cautionary 
instructions that the confession was being admitted against the co-defendant only.30  It also 
read the right to counsel expansively, extending its scope to pre-trial proceedings such as 
arraignments,31 some post-arrest32 and post-indictment interrogations,33 and post-
indictment lineups,34 finding that it applied irrespective of a defendant’s request for 
counsel,35 and creating a per se exclusionary rule prohibiting the use of testimony of some 
un-counseled identifications.36  Finally, the Court read expansively the right to compulsory 
process and struck down a statute that created a per se rule against the admissibility of 
testimony by persons who had participated in the crime with the defendant.37   
 
This is not to say that the Warren Court read all Sixth Amendment provisions broadly.  For 
example, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment’s text that provides that the right to a jury 
trial if to be provided “in all criminal prosecutions,” when the Court incorporated the right 
to jury trial, it cited prior precedent to hold that the right applies only to trials of non-petty 
crimes.38  While the Court subsequently read the right to jury trial to include criminal 
contempt proceedings, it excluded “petty” contempt proceedings.39  Nevertheless, overall, 
the Warren Court is properly seen as having taken an expansive approach to the Sixth 
Amendment. 
 
There was a fundamental shift in the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence during the 
Burger Court era from one that stressed ensuring governmental compliance with the 
procedural protections guaranteed to defendants by the Sixth Amendment to one that was 
increasingly deferential of law enforcement efforts.40  This fundamental realignment of the 
Court’s jurisprudential approach was evident not only in its imposition of significant 
obstacles with regard to the ability of federal courts to remedy constitutional violations in 
                                                 
30 Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). 
31 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961). 
32 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). 
33 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).  But see Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 168 (2001); Moran 
v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 n.16 (1985). 
34 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967). 
35 Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962). 
36 Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1967). 
37 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
38 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968).  The Burger and Rehnquist Courts re-affirmed this reading of 
the right to jury trial.  See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970); Blanton v. City of North Las 
Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). 
39 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 210 (1968).  See also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149-50 
(1969). 
40 See generally Donald A. Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its Conservative Critics: Toward a Unified 
Theory of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 591 (1990); Peter Arenella, Rethinking 
the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 
185 (1983); Herbert L. Packer, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). 
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habeas proceedings,41 but also in its more restrictive view of constitutional procedural 
protections in criminal cases.42 
 
The Court’s restrictive construction of the Sixth Amendment manifested itself in different 
forms.  In some cases, the restrictive construction was a result of the Court’s limitation of 
the scope of the right.  For example, the Burger Court narrowed the class of cases to which 
the right to jury trial applies, finding that it did not apply to probation revocation 
hearings,43 juvenile court proceedings,44 or contempt proceedings where the sentences 
imposed were subsequently reduced to the equivalent of a single term of six months.45  The 
Court similarly narrowed the scope of the right to counsel:  while the Court rejected states’ 
efforts to limit the right to counsel to petty crimes,46 it restricted the right to felonies and 
those misdemeanor cases where the defendant is imprisoned.47  The Court also limited the 
scope of the right to counsel by finding that it did not apply to parole or probation 
revocation hearings48 or to post-arrest lineups conducted before the initiation of adverse 
judicial proceedings.49   
 
In other instances, the restrictive reading was due to the Burger Court’s incorporation 
within the definitional elements of a constitutional right of a requirement that defendants 
show that they were harmed; the absence of harm precluded the finding of a constitutional 
violation, in essence making these rights turn on the defendant’s potential guilt or 
innocence.50  For example, one of the four factors set forth by the Court for determining 
whether the right to speedy trial is violated is whether the defendant can demonstrate that 
the delay was prejudicial.51  Similarly, irrespective of how deficient an attorney’s 
performance, so long as the attorney subjected the government’s case to meaningful 
                                                 
41 See Smith, supra Note 27, at 1070. 
42 See id. (“[M]any Warren Court precedents were curtailed or at least not significantly extended, and the 
Court’s application of Warren-era precedents began to take on a distinctly more prosecution-friendly 
flavor.”). 
43 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.420, 435 n.7 (1984). 
44 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). 
45 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974). 
46 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). 
47 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).  See also Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 223 (1980), rev’d on 
other grounds by Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
48 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 787 (1973). 
49 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).  
50 While the Warren Court too had required a showing of harm through the adoption of the harmless error 
doctrine, that came into play only with regard to remedies – that is, only after defendants established a 
constitutional violation were courts to consider whether that error was harmful enough to warrant relief.  By 
incorporating the harm element into the definition of the constitutional right, the Burger Court made it more 
difficult to establish a violation of the right, which had the effect not only of reducing the normative value of 
the right, but also of making the same textual right more meaningful for innocent defendants than for those 
who might be guilty.  In addition, the Burger Court’s approach also shifted the burden of proof – rather than 
have the state bear the burden of showing that the constitutional violation was harmless as required by the 
Warren Court’s harmless error doctrine, the Burger Court required the defendant to show the harmfulness of 
the violation.  
51 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).  See also United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 316 (1986). 
8 THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE 
 
adversarial testing, a defendant cannot establish a violation of the right to counsel without 
demonstrating that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial.52   
 
In a similar vein, the Burger Court read the right of confrontation restrictively by 
incorporating within its definitional elements a showing of unreliability.  In particular, the 
Court held that the use of out of court statements offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted, i.e. hearsay statements, did not offend the Confrontation Clause despite the lack 
of opportunity for the defendant to confront the source of the underlying statement not 
only if the statement fell within a firmly rooted hearsay evidence, but also if the statement 
bore particularized indicia of reliability.53 
 
The foregoing is not to suggest that the Burger Court uniformly read Sixth Amendment 
rights restrictively.  On the contrary, there were numerous notable expansive readings of 
the Sixth Amendment during this period.  For example, the Court enunciated a broad 
vision of the right to a jury trial, finding that it included a right to have the jury venire – the 
pool of potential jurors from which the petit jury is selected – reflect a fair cross section of 
society.54  The Court also read the right to jury trial broadly to require that the trial court 
ask race-specific questions during voir dire in some cases.55  It also read the public trial 
clause expansively to include pre-trial proceedings.56  In addition, the Court re-affirmed the 
primacy of the Confrontation Clause by finding that a state’s policy interest in protecting 
the confidentiality of juvenile delinquency records did not supersede the right to cross-
examine witnesses.57  The Court also read the right to counsel expansively58 to extend to 
critical stages prior to trial,59 post-arraignment interrogations60 post-indictment 
conversations with police informants61 and pre-trial psychiatric examinations;62 to include 
the right to conflict-free representation;63 to include the right of the defendant to self-
representation;64 and to be the proper subject of a claim for habeas relief even regarding an 
attorney’s incompetent representation with respect to a Fourth Amendment issue.65  
                                                 
52 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  But see United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); 
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1983).   
53 Ohio v Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
54 Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).  The Rehnquist Court 
subsequently held that this fair-cross section requirement is limited to the venire from which the jury is 
selected; it does not extend to the actual jury seated.  Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990). 
55 Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).  But see Ristaino v. 
Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981). 
56 Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (1984). 
57 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
58 The Court, however, restrictively construed the remedy for a violation of this right, holding that the denial 
of counsel at critical stages would be subject to harmless error analysis rather than result in automatic 
reversal.  See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1970). 
59 Id.  
60 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 399 (1977). 
61 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980). 
62 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-71 (1981). 
63 Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1978). 
64 Faretta v. California 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975). 
65 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986). 
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Finally, the Court read the speedy trial clause expansively in holding that the only remedy 
for a speedy trial violation is the dismissal of the indictment with prejudice.66   
 
Nevertheless, while the Burger Court did read some provisions expansively, there was a 
discernible shift towards a restrictive reading of the Sixth Amendment.  Indeed, 
paradoxically, a number of the Burger Court’s expansive readings actually opened the door 
to future restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment.67   
 
The Rehnquist Court, while imposing significantly greater procedural hurdles than the 
Burger Court with regard to the ability of federal courts to remedy effectively 
constitutional violations in habeas proceedings,68 largely mirrored the Burger Court’s 
jurisprudential approach to the Sixth Amendment – while the Court read some provisions 
expansively, it read many other provisions restrictively.69 
 
In a pair of decisions during the earlier years of the Rehnquist Court, the Court read the 
Compulsory Process clause restrictively, subjugating it to policy considerations.  First, the 
Court held that the exclusion of testimony as a sanction  for  defense  counsel’s  deliberate 
failure to comply with a discovery request did not deny the defendant’s Compulsory 
Process right to have witnesses testify because “‘[t]he Sixth Amendment does not confer 
the right to present testimony free from the legitimate demands of the adversarial 
system.”’70  Second, the Court held that this right was not violated by the exclusion of 
evidence of the defendant’s prior sexual relationship with the witness because of the 
defendant’s failure to comply with notice and hearing requirement of state rape-shield 
statute.71  Ironically, these restrictive readings of the Compulsory Process were predicated 
on the earlier expansive reading of this Clause by the Burger Court.72 
 
Just a year after the Rehnquist Court read the Sixth Amendment expansively in finding that 
the Confrontation Clause was violated when a screen shielded a child witness from the 
                                                 
66 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). 
67 See infra Sections III.B. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause) and III.C. 
(discussing the entanglement of the Public Trial Clause). 
68 See Smith, supra Note 27, at 1076 (“Although habeas corpus remains available for relitigation of the 
constitutionality of state-court convictions, reversal on habeas has become a prospect that state courts simply 
need not be concerned with in the vast majority of cases.”). 
69 Scholars have pointed to a number of external factors as possible explanations for the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts’ adoption of a restrictive view of the Sixth Amendment.  Some have pointed to increased 
crime and increased politicization of crime.  See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 2331, 2349 (1993) (“The crime rate was rising, people were frightened, and society needed someone or 
something to blame. Eyes fell on the Court, which was suspected of abusing its authority to protect the rights 
of criminal suspects and placing law-abiding citizens at risk.”).  Others have alluded to other socio-economic 
developments.  See Thomas III, supra Note 3.  Still others have alluded to the change in jurisprudence to the 
natural consequences of a change in the Court’s personnel, reflecting a change in judicial philosophy or 
ideology, such as increased sensitivity to federalism concerns.  See Archibald Cox, Federalism and 
Individual Rights Under the Burger Court, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1978) 
70 Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
71 Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991). 
72 See infra Section III.B. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause). 
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defendant during testimony,73 a sharply divided Court read the right to Confrontation 
restrictively in a similar situation.  Specifically, holding that a defendant’s right to face-to-
face confrontation must give way when “necessary to further an important public policy 
[if] the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured,” the Court held that the clause was 
not violated by a statute that allowed a witness to be examined in a separate room from the 
defendant, with the testimony being televised to the courtroom.74   
 
The Rehnquist Court largely read the right to counsel restrictively, with some notable 
expansive readings of the right during the final years of the Court.  The Court read the 
Sixth Amendment narrowly with respect to right to effective assistance of counsel,75 the 
right to conflict free representation,76 eliciting of statements using informants,77 the 
imposition of hurdles in the defendant’s ability to pay counsel’s fees,78 and the scope of the 
right to counsel.79  At the same time, particularly towards the end of the Court’s era, the 
Rehnquist Court did read the right to counsel broadly with respect to the scope of the right 
to counsel,80 effective assistance of counsel,81 and use of statements elicited in violation of 
the right to counsel.82 
 
The Rehnquist Court’s expansive readings were most pronounced in the context of the 
right of confrontation, particular as to the use of hearsay evidence,83 the right to cross-
examination84  and the use of a non-testifying confession at a joint trial.85  The Court also 
read the Speedy Trial clause expansively by finding a violation even where the defendant 
could not show particularized harm due to the delay.86  In contrast to these expansive 
readings of the Sixth Amendment, the Court largely read the right to jury trial 
restrictively.87 
                                                 
73 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1021 (1988). 
74 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 
75 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2003); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 700 (2002). 
76 Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172-74 (2002); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 (1987); Wheat v. 
United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988); Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1990). 
77 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 440, 460-61 (1986). 
78 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989); United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 
615 (1989). 
79 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 173-74 (1991). 
80 Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002); Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001). 
81 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 377 (2005); Wiggins v.  Smith, 539 U.S. 510,  519  (2003); Glover v. 
United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203-04 (2001); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000); Roe v.  Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483-84 (2000).  
82 Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524-25 (2004); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680, 686 (1989) (per 
curiam); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988).  But see Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 424 
(1987). 
83 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). 
84 Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988) (per curiam). 
85 Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192 (1998); Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193 (1987).  But see 
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211 (1987). 
86 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.647 (1992). 
87 Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322 (1996); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990); Blanton v. City of 
North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989). 
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Finally, while it is far too early in the Roberts Court’s tenure to authoritatively evaluate its 
approach to the Sixth Amendment, its initial decisions contravene the popularly 
characterization of the Court as being less protective of individual liberty in criminal 
prosecutions.  While such a reputation might well be reflected in the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence88 or its jurisprudence in capital cases,89 the Court decidedly has 
read the Sixth Amendment expansively in a number of decisions involving the right to 
confrontation,90 compulsory process91 and counsel. 92  It remains, however, far from clear 
whether this limited jurisprudence evidences a deeply rooted commitment to an expansive 
reading of the Sixth Amendment or simply a historical accident due to the particular issues 
raised by the first set of Sixth Amendment cases to come before the Court.93  
 
*     *     * 
 
It is, thus, evident, that after a long period of dormancy, the Court’s Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence underwent significant change during the Warren, Burger and Rehnquist 
Courts, with the scope and meaning of the provisions of the Sixth Amendment witnessing 
a series of expansive and restrictive readings.  During the course of this jurisprudential 
change, the Court adopted several textually inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment.  
For example, contrary to the textual mandate that its procedural protections be provided in 
“all” prosecutions, the Court had held that the rights to counsel and jury trial only apply in 
subsets of prosecutions, and that too in differing subsets.94  Moreover, going beyond the 
text, the Court has expanded the scope of the compulsory process clause to include a right 
to have witnesses testify and has expanded the scope of the right of public trials to include 
the right to public pre-trial proceedings.95  Furthermore, by requiring that defendants show 
some harm in order to demonstrate a violation the Speedy Trial, Confrontation and 
Counsel Clauses, the Court contravened the textual mandate that these provisions apply in 
all prosecutions, including those of persons who might well be guilty.96   
 
Following a discussion in Section II of the Court’s two recent seminal decisions 
disentangling the Sixth Amendment, in Section III, this Article discusses each of the 
                                                 
88 See John D. Castiglione, Hudson and Samson: The Roberts Court Confronts Privacy, Dignity, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 68 La. L. Rev. 63, 64 (2007). 
89 See Kenneth C. Haas, The Emerging Death Penalty Jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, 6 Pierce L. Rev. 
387, 388 (2008).  
90 Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008). 
91 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
92 Rothgery v. Gillespie County, Texas, 128 S. Ct. 2578 (2008); Indiana v. Edwards, 128 S. Ct. 2379 (2008); 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2563 (2006). 
93 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Roberts Court, Stare Decisis, and the Future of Constitutional Law, 82 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1533, 1534 (2008). 
94 See infra Section III.A. (discussing the entanglement of the Predicate Clause). 
95 See infra Sections III.B. and III.C. (discussing the entanglement of the Compulsory Process and Public 
Trial clauses respectively). 
96 See infra Sections III.D., III.E. and III.F. (discussing the entanglement of the Speedy Trial, Confrontation 
and Counsel clauses respectively). 
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Court’s textually-inconsistent readings, explaining how each is the result of the Court’s 
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause.   
 
II.  AT  A  CROSSROADS:  THE  RECENT  DISENTANGLEMENT OF THE 
SIXTH  AMENDMENT   
 
The past few years have witnessed two particularly critical developments in the Court’s 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  Commentators have celebrated or decried Apprendi v. 
New Jersey
97
 and Crawford v. Washington98 and their progeny, noting the important 
changes they marked in the Court’s sentencing and Confrontation Clause jurisprudences 
respectively.  As discussed below, however, these two lines of cases are better seen as part 
of the same effort to disentangle the Sixth Amendment from the Fourteenth Amendment 
and revert to a more textually-grounded jurisprudence. 
 
A.  THE “ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS” PREDICATE 
 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court, citing both the Due Process clause and the 
Sixth Amendment, struck down a state sentencing statute that authorized a higher penalty 
if the sentencing judge, rather than a jury, found that the defendant had committed a hate 
crime.99  Since the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was previously understood to apply 
only at trials,100 Apprendi and its progeny have been both celebrated and criticized by 
scholars for having extended that right to a subset of sentencing proceedings.101  These 
cases, however, are better understood as an attempt to define the contours of the Sixth 
Amendment’s unambiguous, but often forgotten predicate – namely that its procedural 
protections, including the right to a jury trial, apply to “all criminal prosecutions.”102  In 
other words, as discussed below, rather than extending the right to a jury trial to sentencing 
proceedings, Apprendi and its progeny are better viewed as having disentangled the Sixth 
                                                 
97  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
98  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
99  530 U.S. at 490. The Court subsequently struck down sentencing guideline schemes that required the 
sentencing judge to impose a higher sentence than that which would automatically follow the jury’s verdict at 
trial.  See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 
(2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
100 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984).   See also Alan C. Michaels, Trial Rights at Sentencing, 81 
N.C.L. REV. 1771 (2003). 
101 See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: Constitutional 
Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 216 (2005); Keven R. Reitz, The New 
Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1122 
(2005); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 389 (2002); Benjamin J. Priester, 
Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281 (2001); 
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 243 (2001). 
102 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
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and Fourteenth Amendments, locating some sentencing proceedings – those that constitute 
“criminal prosecutions” – within the scope of the Sixth Amendment. 
 
Prior to, and for a period shortly following, the adoption of the Sixth Amendment, the 
underlying criminal conviction and the resulting sentence were strictly connected, with the 
legislature having specified fixed punishments for every crime.103  Since the trial judge 
automatically imposing a pre-determined fixed sentence after the conviction, there were no 
meaningfully distinct sentencing proceedings.104  In other words, a criminal prosecution 
included both the conviction and sentence.  As such, the procedural protections of the 
Sixth Amendment applied to determinations of sentence as much as they applied to 
determinations of guilt. 
 
The fundamental shift in sentencing policy in the nineteenth century, however, led to the 
development of distinct sentencing proceedings.  More than a century preceding modern 
sentencing reforms, states adopted indeterminate sentencing schemes, affording trial 
judges considerable discretion in fashioning a sentence.105  Under these schemes, whose 
goal was the rehabilitation of offenders, judges were to make individualized sentencing 
decisions that could be based on factors not involved in the determination of guilt, such as 
defendants’ criminal history and personal characteristics.106  
 
It was not until the mid-twentieth century that the Court confronted the question of what 
constitutional rights were implicated by these distinct sentencing proceedings.  In Williams 
v New York,107 the Court faced a constitutional challenge to New York’s sentencing 
procedures.  A New York jury had convicted the defendant of first-degree murder and had 
recommended a life sentence; the judge, however, overrode the jury’s recommendation and 
imposed a death sentence, finding that the defendant was a “menace to society.”108  Since 
the judge’s conclusions at sentencing were based on evidence that had not been presented 
to the jury (including hearsay allegations of the defendant’s “morbid sexuality” and that 
the defendant, although not convicted, had been involved in 30 other crimes), the 
defendant challenged both the lack of notice about this additional evidence and the lack of 
a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses.109 
 
Since Williams was a state case, it was not surprising that the defendant, and the Court, 
viewed these constitutional claims solely through the lens of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause.  After all, the Sixth Amendment, which since the time of the adoption 
                                                 
103 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478-79 (2000). 
104 See Susan N. Herman, The Tail that Wagged the Dog: Bifurcated Fact-Finding under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Limits of Due Process, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 289, 302 (1992) (“The facts on 
which sentencing was based were decided by the jury, so there was little need for a separate proceeding.”). 
105 Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing 
Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005).   
106 Id.  
107 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
108 Williams, 337 U.S. at 242-44. 
109  Id.  
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of the Bill of Rights had been understood to apply only to the federal government, had not 
yet been incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment and made applicable to the states.110  
In finding that the imposition of the death sentence in Williams did not violate the Due 
Process Clause, the Court distinguished between determinations of guilt and 
determinations of sentence, finding that the latter properly were governed by different 
rules.111   
 
The Court’s provision of lesser rights at sentencing in state courts in Williams was 
consonant with traditional Due Process analysis, whereby the extent of procedural 
protections granted by the Due Process clause was calibrated to the type of proceeding and 
interest involved.112  This does not mean that the outcome of Williams was proper – 
indeed, since the right to notice is one of the most basic, elemental components of even 
minimal due process, an argument can be made that the Court erred in denying the 
constitutional claim in Williams.  But, for purposes of this Article, the important point is 
not that the outcome in Williams might or might not be proper, but rather that the Court 
relied on traditional Due Process analysis, not the Sixth Amendment, in bifurcating the 
underlying determinations of guilt from determinations of sentence and granting lesser 
protections in the latter.113   
 
Distinct sentencing proceedings remained the norm even as the country veered back to 
determinate sentencing.  Beginning in the 1960s, concerns began to be raised about both 
the goals of punishment and the methods of sentencing.  Specifically, “[r]esearchers and 
commentators contended that efforts to rehabilitate the offenders had proved largely 
ineffective and that broad judicial sentencing discretion produced unjustifiable differences 
in the sentence meted out to similar defendants.”114  These concerns led to a shift towards 
the retributive goals of punishment and determinate sentencing, with many states, and the 
federal government, adopting “new determinate sentencing systems based on ‘guidelines’ 
that would help to channel the discretion of the sentencer.”115   
                                                 
110 See infra text accompanying Note 24 (discussing the incorporation of the Sixth Amendment by the 
Warren Court in the 1960s). 
111 Id. at 252. 
112 See Todd Meadow, Almendarez-Torres v. United States: Constitutional Limitations on Government’s 
Power to Define Crimes, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 1583 (1999).  For example, administrative hearings implicate a 
less robust construction of Due Process.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).  Importantly, in 
recent years, the Court has rejected the Mathews approach for determining whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause was violated during a state criminal trial.  See Medina v. California, 505 
U.S. 437, 443 (1992).  Instead of using a balancing analysis, the Court now asks whether the state practice in 
question “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental” or whether it “transgresses any recognized principle of “fundamental fairness” in 
operation.”  See id. at 445, 448 (citations omitted). 
113 This left open the question of whether sentencing proceedings in federal court would continue to be bound 
by the Sixth Amendment, as at the time of the Founding, or whether they would fall instead within the scope 
of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause. 
114  Berman, supra Note 105, at 279. 
115  Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 265 
(2001). 
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Almost four decades after Williams, the Court addressed the implication of constitutional 
rights by the new determinate sentencing schemes.  McMillan v. Pennsylvania involved a 
constitutional challenge to a state statute that required a judge to impose a mandatory 
minimum sentence if a defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of certain 
felonies.116  Under the statute, the requisite factfinding of firearm possession was to be 
made not by the jury at the guilt phase, but rather by the judge at sentencing.117  While the 
defendants raised Due Process claims regarding burdens and standards of proof, they also 
raised a Sixth Amendment claim that the state scheme violated the right to a jury trial.  In 
summarily rejecting this claim, the Court stated simply, “We need only note that there is 
no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing . . . .” 118   
 
The Court’s decision in McMillan, thus, adopted the earlier, Due Process-based, 
bifurcation of guilt and sentencing proceedings in the context of the Sixth Amendment, 
entangling the two clauses.  What was a perfectly appropriate Due Process analysis in 
Williams had now been adopted in the Sixth Amendment context, with no discussion of the 
text or history of the Sixth Amendment.  While the Court’s holding in McMillan dealt with 
state sentencing proceedings, this entanglement had important implications for federal 
sentencing proceedings.  As noted earlier, since a “criminal prosecution” at the time of the 
Founding involved both determinations of guilt and determinations of sentence, all 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment applied at that time to federal sentencing proceedings.  
By now finding that the right to a jury trial did not apply to sentencing proceedings, the 
Court in McMillan essentially held that sentencing proceedings fall outside the scope of 
criminal prosecutions.  In other words, a criminal prosecution terminates with the 
determination of guilt; the subsequent determination of sentence in federal court is 
governed only by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process clause.   
 
The Court in McMillan, moreover, adopted a formalistic approach for distinguishing 
between factfindings to be made by the jury during determinations of guilt and those that 
could be made by the judge at sentencing proceedings.  Finding itself unable to “lay down 
any ‘bright line’ test,”119 the Court gave heavy weight to whether the legislature labeled the 
fact an ‘element of the offense’ or a ‘sentencing factor.’120  While it acknowledged that 
“there are constitutional limits to the State's power in this regard,” the Court concluded that 
“the state legislature’s definition . . . is usually dispositive.”121   
 
                                                 
116  477 U.S. 79, 81 (1986). 
117 Id. at 81 (citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982)).  
118  477 U.S. at 91. 
119 Id. 
120 If gun possession belonged in the former category, it would be part of a ‘criminal prosecution,’ subject to 
the Sixth Amendment’s right to jury trial and would need to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
prosecutor; if it belonged to the latter category, it would make it fall outside the scope of the Sixth 
Amendment.  This formalistic reliance on the label assigned by the legislature mirrored the approach the 
Court had taken in distinguishing between elements of offenses and affirmative defenses. 
121  Id. at 85-86. 
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The McMillan majority’s formalistic approach for determining whether a factual 
determination is part of the “criminal prosecution” or part of a sentencing proceeding, 
while in keeping with the Rehnquist Court’s emphasis on federalism, drew dissents from 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens, who objected to the Court’s abdication 
of its responsibility to define the scope of constitutional protections.  These Justices argued 
that undue deference to legislatures would permit states to circumvent constitutional 
requirements, including the protections of the Sixth Amendment, by simply labeling 
essential facts as being ‘sentencing factors.’122   
 
Over time, other members of the Court began to voice similar concerns.  For example, in 
Almendarez- Torres v. United States, Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter and Ginsburg, found the deference to the legislature inappropriate where the statute 
did not expressly indicate that the fact at issue was a “sentencing enhancement” and in fact 
seemed to indicate the opposite.123  The following year, in Jones v. United States, the Court 
went further – even though the structure of the statute had led both the District Court and 
the Court of Appeals to find that the facts at issue were ‘sentencing enhancements,’ not 
‘elements of offenses,’ the majority found that it was not an adequate indicia of legislative 
intent.124 
 
It was in dictum in Jones that the Court first enunciated the principle by which it would 
independently distinguish (without undue deference to the legislature) between ‘elements 
of offenses’ and ‘sentencing factors.’ In a footnote, the majority stated that “any fact (other 
than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime” must comply with 
the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment.125   
 
This principle formed the basis for the Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey to strike 
down a statute that permitted the imposition of a higher sentence if the sentencing judge 
found that the underlying crime was also a hate crime.126  While the New Jersey legislature 
unambiguously had set forth the hate crime provision in the statutory section titled 
“Sentencing,” the Court refused to defer to the legislature.  Instead, the Court, recognizing 
its obligation to independently define the scope of constitutional provisions, adopted the 
principle announced in dictum in Jones and held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”127 
                                                 
122  Id. at 93-94 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id. at 95-104 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
123  523 U.S. 224, 249 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
124  526 U.S. 227, 231-34 (1999). 
125  Id. at 243 n.6. 
126 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
127  530 U.S. at 490.  In subsequent cases, the Court interpreted the ‘statutory maximum’ penalty in a 
restrictive manner and struck down state and federal mandatory sentencing guideline schemes to the extent 
they required the sentencing judge to impose a sentence higher than that which could be imposed based 
solely on the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  See Cunningham v. California, 
127 S.Ct. 856 (2007); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 231 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004). 
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While the majority opinion in Apprendi relied on historical and policy grounds to justify its 
holding, the concurring opinions provided a textual grounding for the Apprendi rule.  
Justice Thomas, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, tethered the issue to the word 
“crime” because three Constitutional provisions were predicated on this word:  (1) the 
Sixth Amendment right “to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;” (2) the 
Fifth Amendment right in federal cases to a grand jury indictment; and (3) the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial.128  Since “[a]ll of these constitutional protections turn on 
determining which facts constitute the “crime” – that is, which facts are the “elements” or 
“ingredients” of a crime,” Justice Thomas explained, “it is critical to know which facts are 
elements.”129   
 
The textual tether for the Apprendi rule provided by Justice Thomas, while on the right 
track, missed the mark.  For example, the word “crime” arises in the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial clause only insofar as to indicate the appropriate jurisdiction from which the jury 
should be drawn; it does not have any implication for the scope of the jury’s factfinding 
task at the trial.  Instead, Justice Scalia alluded to the proper textual tether for the Apprendi 
rule when he concluded in his concurring opinion that “the guarantee that “[i]n all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury,” 
has no intelligible content unless it means that all the facts which must exist in order to 
subject the defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury.”130  
Plainly stated, the Sixth Amendment’s predicate clause – “in all criminal prosecutions” – 
presupposes prosecutions of “crimes” and as such, facts that constitute elements of crime 
are properly adjudicated as part of the “prosecution” subject to the procedural protections 
granted to defendants by Sixth Amendment.  In other words, irrespective of legislative 
labeling, facts that increase the statutory maximum penalty are part of the initial ‘criminal 
prosecution’ not the subsequent ‘sentencing.’   
 
Apprendi and its progeny, thus, are best seen not as having extended the Sixth Amendment 
right to jury trial to a subset of sentencing proceedings, but rather as a reclaiming of that 
subset of sentencing proceedings within the scope of the Sixth Amendment’s “all criminal 
prosecutions” predicate clause.  
 
B.  RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”131  This Confrontation 
Clause, which has been understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards (in 
person testimony by witnesses; testimony given under oath; testimony that is subject to 
                                                 
128 530 U.S. at 499 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
129 Id. at 500 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
130 Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
131 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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cross examination; and testimony where the jury can observe the witness’ demeanor),132 
has broad implications for the use of out-of-court statements that are presented for the truth 
of the matter asserted – i.e. hearsay evidence.  At one extreme, the clause could be read as 
precluding any evidence that a defendant is unable to personally confront, resulting in the 
exclusion of all hearsay evidence;133 at the other extreme, it could be read narrowly as 
applying only to persons who are offering testimony in court, allowing the use of any 
hearsay consistent with rules of evidence.134  As discussed below, prior to the landmark 
decision in Crawford v. Washington,135 the manner in which the Supreme Court attempted 
to steer a middle course led to the needless entanglement of Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence with Due Process considerations. 
 
The path to entanglement began over a century ago in Mattox v. United States when the 
Court rejected a defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim in a case in which prior testimony 
from two witnesses was admitted at a subsequent trial that occurred after these witnesses 
had died.136  Since the defendant had been afforded a full opportunity to confront these 
witnesses at the initial trial, the Court felt that “considerations of public policy and the 
necessities of the case” required that the prior recorded testimony be admitted despite the 
strict requirements of the Confrontation Clause.137  Notably, in dictum, the Court drew an 
analogy to the admissibility of dying declarations, a category of hearsay evidence that 
traditionally has been admitted despite obvious confrontation clause problems.138   
 
The Mattox Court’s linking, albeit in dictum, of the Confrontation Clause and the rules of 
evidence paved the way for the future entangling of the Sixth Amendment with due 
process concerns by affirming the ability of courts to “admit out-of-court statements that 
were just as reliable as those covered by the traditional exceptions without finding a 
constitutional violation.”139  In Dutton v. Evans,140 for example, “Justice Stewart’s plurality 
opinion brought the reliability theme to center stage.”141  The Court upheld the defendant’s 
conviction even though the trial court had admitted the hearsay testimony of a jailhouse 
snitch, finding that there were sufficient “indicia of reliability.”142  Notably, Justice Stewart 
claimed that “the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for 
the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that ‘the trier of 
fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.’”143   
 
                                                 
132 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). 
133 Id. at 165. 
134  Id. at 165-66. 
135  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
136  156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
137  Id. at 243. 
138  Id. at 243-44. 
139  John G. Douglass, Beyond Admissibility: Real Confrontation, Virtual Cross-Examination, and the Right 
to Confront Hearsay, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 202. 
140  400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
141  Douglass, supra Note 139, at 203. 
142  Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. 
143  Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)) (emphasis added). 
19 THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE 
 
A decade later, the Court fully embraced the centrality of reliability concerns in resolving 
Confrontation Clause claims in Ohio v. Roberts.144  In approving the use of transcribed 
testimony from a prior preliminary hearing where the defendant had been provided an 
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, the Court restated its narrow view of the 
“underlying purpose” of the Confrontation Clause as being merely “to augment accuracy in 
the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse 
evidence.”145  The Court then explored the relationship between the Confrontation Clause 
and hearsay evidence and identified two principles at work.  First, for hearsay evidence to 
be admissible, the declarant generally must be unavailable at trial.146 Second, the hearsay 
evidence must bear “adequate indicia of reliability,” such as “fall[ing] within a firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or having “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”147  As 
one scholar concluded, “[r]eliability has become the surrogate for cross-examination.  
‘Firmly rooted’ hearsay exceptions are the surrogate for reliability.  The Confrontation 
Clause is simply an exclusionary rule for unreliable hearsay, and the law of evidence 
largely defines the rule.”148   
 
While the Court used this reliability framework subsequently to resolve several 
Confrontation Clause cases,149 some members of the Court began to voice misgivings 
about the Court’s approach.150  In a prescient concurring opinion in White v. Illinois, 
Justice Thomas, who was joined in the opinion by Justice Scalia, noted that “Confrontation 
Clause jurisprudence has evolved in a manner that is perhaps inconsistent with the text and 
history of the Clause itself.”151  The Court’s approach, Justice Thomas added, had led to 
the entangling of the Sixth Amendment jurisprudence with Due Process:  “reliability,” 
Justice Thomas noted, “is more properly a due process concern.”152   
 
A little over a decade later, Justice Thomas’ position gained majority support in Crawford 
v. Washington.153  In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court disentangled the 
Confrontation Clause from Due Process considerations, stating that while “the Clause’s 
                                                 
144  448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
145  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
146  Id. at 65. 
147  Id. at 65-66. 
148  Douglass, supra Note 139, at 206.  See also Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 
GEO. L.J. 641 (1996); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 
1011, 1015 (1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s subsequent treatment of this framework has tended to make 
confrontation doctrine resemble ordinary hearsay law.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation 
Clause to the Sixth Amendment, 35 UCLA L. REV. 557, 662 (1988) (“[E]vidence law now controls the 
content of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause.”).   
149  See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805 (1990); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
150  Scholars too criticized the Court’s approach.  As one scholar noted, the Court had attempted to “achieve 
harmony” between two opposing interpretations of the Clause “by rendering the preservation of procedural 
fairness subservient to the pursuit of substantive justice in the form of accurate verdicts.”  Philip Halpren, 
The Confrontation Clause and the Search for Truth in Criminal Trials, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 165, 200 (1988-89). 
151  White, 502 U.S. at 358 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
152  Id. at 363-64 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
153  541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, []it is a procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be 
assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.”154   
 
Having disentangled the Sixth Amendment, the Court then offered a new approach to 
Confrontation Clause issues.  Drawing on the historical background of the Clause,155 the 
Court concluded that the use of testimonial156 hearsay evidence would be permissible 
under the Confrontation Clause only if the declarant was unavailable and the defendant had 
been provided a prior opportunity for cross-examination;157 non-testimonial hearsay 
evidence, on the other hand, would not be regulated by the Confrontation Clause and 
would, instead, be subject only to state rules of evidence.158 
 
Crawford, thus, “represents a sea change in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Sixth 
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”159  It marks a clear effort by the Court to disentangle 
the Sixth Amendment from Due Process considerations and revert to an approach more 
consistent with the Clause’s text.   
 
 
III.  THE  ROAD  AHEAD:  ENTANGLEMENTS  YET  TO  BE  
UNDONE  
 
The Court’s adoption of textually-inconsistent readings of the Sixth Amendment over the 
course of the past few decades can be traced to the interplay between the Sixth 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause.  As discussed in 
Section III.A. below, the Court entangled the two constitutional provisions in the process 
of incorporating the Sixth Amendment, leading to a textually-inconsistent restrictive 
                                                 
154  Id. at 61. 
155 Id. at 42-56. In charting this new course, the Court found the Amendment’s text not to be helpful because 
it was susceptible to a number of reasonable, competing interpretations.  Id. at 42.  
156  Id. at 68-69.  In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), the Court drew the following distinction 
between testimonial and nontestimonial statements:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under 
circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to 
enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the 
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution. 
157 The Court noted that the dying declaration hearsay exception has long been recognized.  Without reaching 
the question of whether the Sixth Amendment incorporates such an exception to the Confrontation Clause, 
the Court stated that “[i]f this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.”  See id. at 
56 n.6. 
158  Id. at 68.   
159  W. Jeremy Counseller & Shannon Rickett, The Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: 
Smaller Mouth, Bigger Teeth, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 22 (2005).   
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reading of the scope of the right to counsel.  Sections III.B. and III.C., which address the 
Compulsory Process and Public Trial clauses respectively, discuss how the Court 
entangled the Sixth Amendment by improperly locating expansive procedural protections 
in the particularized rules of the Sixth Amendment as opposed to deriving the same rights 
from the general principle of Due Process.  Finally, as discussed in Sections III.D., III.E., 
and III.F., the Court entangled the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process Clause by using 
interpretative methodologies suitable for the Due Process Clause to give meaning to the 
Sixth Amendment’s text.  Each of the entanglements discussed below has led to a more 
restrictive reading of the Sixth Amendment, rendering it less protective of individual 
liberty. 
 
A.  THE “ALL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS” PREDICATE 
 
The Sixth Amendment unequivocally mandates that its seven procedural protections be 
provided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions.”160  Despite this unbounded 
predicate, the Court has read into the text a limitation about the scope of the right to 
assistance of counsel, finding that this right is available only in limited subsets of federal 
(and state) prosecutions.  This construction of the right to counsel, arguably the unintended 
result of incorporation, is all the more problematic in light of the Court’s earlier erroneous 
limitation of the right to a jury trial to a different subset of federal (and state) prosecutions.  
Thus, while the Sixth Amendment’s common predicate continues to mean in “all” criminal 
prosecutions for five procedural rights, it has come to mean only in “some” criminal 
prosecutions” for two procedural rights, and this “some” varies according to which of the 
two procedural rights is involved.  As discussed below, this textually inconsistent 
construction can be traced to the entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with the Due 
Process clause. 
 
Since its ratification in 1791, the Sixth Amendment has guaranteed defendants in all 
criminal prosecutions in federal court the right to the assistance of counsel.161  With respect 
to state court prosecutions, on the other hand, prior to 1963, the Court had rejected the 
claim that this right to counsel was applicable to the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment;162 the Court had instead conducted a case-specific review to determine 
whether a state’s failure to appoint counsel violated a defendant’s due process rights.163  
The Court changed direction during the early years of the Warren Court, holding that the 
                                                 
160 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).   
161 This right has long been found to include the right of indigent defendants in federal cases to have the 
government provide them an attorney.  See Johnson v Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938).  Even during the 
common law, while indigent defendants had no right to have attorneys appointed and indeed no defendant 
had the right to have the assistance of counsel, “[i]t was dogma that the court was meant to serve as counsel 
for the prisoner.”  John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at 
Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1049-50 (1994).   
162  See Betts v Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).    
163  See Powell v Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
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right to the assistance of counsel was so “fundamental and essential to a fair trial” that it 
was applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.164   
 
Less than a decade after Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court reaffirmed its clarion call by 
rejecting states’ attempts to limit its scope to serious (that is, non-petty) offenses in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin.165  In doing so, however, the Court used problematic language.  
Perhaps with a desire to achieve unanimity – there was not a single dissent in Argersinger 
v. Hamlin – the Court held that “no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether 
classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at 
trial.”166   
 
Argersinger’s posthoc focus on whether the defendant is imprisoned after a trial without 
counsel was noteworthy not only for its failure to provide meaningful pre-conviction 
guidance to state courts on whether to provide defendants with counsel,167 but also because 
it also opened the door seven years later to a retrenchment of the right to counsel.  In a 5-4 
decision, the Court in Scott v. Illinois held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did 
not apply to all prosecutions in state courts, but only to those cases in which the defendant 
was actually imprisoned.168   
 
Mindful perhaps of Scott’s tortured reasoning, a differently constituted, yet similarly 
closely split, Court later found in Alabama v. Shelton that the Sixth Amendment not only 
applies to those misdemeanor cases in state courts in which the defendant is actually 
imprisoned, but also in those cases where the defendant, while not actually imprisoned, 
was sentenced to imprisonment and that sentence was suspended.169 
 
The Court’s approach in Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton would pose no issue in terms of 
entanglement of the Sixth Amendment if it were limited to state prosecutions.  While it is 
true that as a general matter, the substance of each of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural 
protections is identical in state and federal prosecutions,170 the same need not be true of the 
predicate “in all criminal prosecutions” clause.  This predicate clause speaks not to the 
substance meaning of the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections, but to their scope.  
The Framers of the Sixth Amendment were acutely concerned about the powers of a 
                                                 
164  See Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-45 (1963).   
165  407 U.S. 25 (1972). 
166  Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
167  See Steven Duke, The Right to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 
604 (1975); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Individual Actor v. Institutional Player: Alternating Visions of the 
Public Defender, 84 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2425 n.31 (1996).  
168  440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979).  
169  535 U.S. 654, 657, 674 (2002).  See also Rinat Kitai, What Remains Necessary Following Alabama v. 
Shelton to Fulfill the Right of  a Criminal Defendant to Counsel at the Expense of the State?, 30 OHIO N.U. 
L. REV. 35 (2004).  
170 See Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 183 (noting that once a procedural right is incorporated, “the Court treats 
the Fourteenth Amendment right and the Bill of Rights right as identical protections . . . .”); id. (noting other 
than the size and unanimity of juries, the substance of all provisions of the Sixth Amendment that have been 
incorporated to the states are identical in federal and state prosecutions.) 
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central government, quite the opposite of the concerns driving the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  So, the Court could have held that, while the substantive meaning 
of the right to counsel is identical in federal and state prosecutions, the right to counsel 
applies to different sets of prosecutions: while it applies to all federal prosecutions, it only 
applies to a subset of state prosecutions, those where its presence is essential to a fair 
trial.171  Such a disentangled reading would have allowed the Court to adopt the current 
approach to state prosecutions and would not have changed federal practice much since the 
overwhelming majority of federal prosecutions are for felonies.172 
 
The Court, however, has failed to limit its Argersinger, Scott, and Shelton approach to state 
prosecutions.  While not expressly addressing the issue, the Court in Nichols v. United 
States implicitly assumed that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in federal court is 
constitutional.173  Overturning its earlier decision in Baldasar v. Illinois, the Court held in 
Nichols that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction can be used in a later counseled 
criminal proceeding to enhance a defendant’s sentence in federal prosecutions.174   
 
The Court’s failure to disentangle the right to counsel, thus, has led to a textually 
inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment:  while the text unambiguously extends 
the right to counsel to “all criminal prosecutions” in federal court, the Court has not 
extended the right to those misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is not sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment.   
 
The Court’s textually inconsistent reading also is not faithful to the history of the right to 
counsel.  Under the common law, while a person charged with a felony or treason was 
denied the assistance of counsel, the right to counsel was guaranteed in civil cases and 
misdemeanors.175  The colonists also extended the right to misdemeanor cases – in almost 
every instance, the colonies adopted provisions guaranteeing the right to the assistance of 
counsel in all criminal proceedings.176  The Framers undoubtedly were familiar with the 
extension of the right to counsel to misdemeanors under the common law and in the 
colonies when they adopted the “in all criminal prosecutions” predicate in the Sixth 
Amendment.  
 
The Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the right to counsel proves all the more 
problematic when considered in conjunction with the Court’s construction of the Predicate 
                                                 
171 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1260-84 
(1992) (discussing the theory of refined incorporation). 
172  See Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71 GEO. L.J. 253, 254 n.4 (1982) (“The number 
of federal misdemeanor prosecutions (including both 18 U.S.C. § 3401 misdemeanors and 18 U.S.C. § 1(3) 
petty offenses), however, is so low—approximately 100,000 in 1980—that one can safely say that state 
prosecutions account for more than 98% of all misdemeanor prosecutions.”)  (citing 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 11, 90-91). 
173  511 U.S. 738 (1994). 
174  446 U.S. 222 (1980). 
175  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60 (1932).   
176  See id. at 61-64. 
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Clause with regard to the other Sixth Amendment rights.  Specifically, the Court has held 
that the right to jury trial does not apply to petty crimes – that is, crimes for which the 
potential punishment is six months or less.177  At the same time, the Court has not qualified 
the Predicate Clause with respect to the other five procedural rights in the Sixth 
Amendment.  As such, the same text has been endowed with three different meanings.  “In 
all criminal prosecutions” means the following:  in the context of the right to counsel, it 
means “in felony prosecutions and misdemeanor prosecutions where the defendant is 
actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment;” in the context of the right to jury trial, it 
means “in non-petty criminal prosecutions”; and in the context of the rights to a public 
trial, a speedy trial, notice, confrontation and compulsory process, it continues to mean “in 
all criminal prosecutions.”  
 
Furthermore, insofar as the Court drew inspiration from its earlier jurisprudence limiting 
the Predicate Clause in the jury trial context, such reliance was misplaced.  This is because 
the Court’s jury trial jurisprudence was fundamentally flawed.  In concluding that the petty 
trials fell outside the scope of the right to jury trial, the Court had focused on the word 
“criminal” in the Predicate Clause.178  Referring to Blackstone’s definition of a “crime,” 
the Court found that the word had two meanings: while a broad reading of the word 
covered all criminal activity, including misdemeanors, a narrow reading of the word 
covered only “offenses . . . of a deeper and more atrocious dye.”179  “[S]maller faults and 
omissions of less consequence,” on the other hand, “are comprised under the gentler name 
of ‘misdemeanors’ only” under the narrow reading.180  The Court then discussed the 
adoption of the right to a jury trial in Article III, noting that the text of the jury trial 
provision in Article III181 had been changed at the Constitutional Convention from “‘the 
trial of all criminal offenses. . . . shall be by jury’” to “‘the trial of all crimes.’”182  In other 
words, by adopting “crimes” instead of “all criminal offenses,” the Court found that the 
Framers intended to adopt the narrow definition of “crime,” the one that excluded 
misdemeanor offenses from its scope.   
 
The Court’s reading of the text, however, was fundamentally flawed.  First, “Blackstone 
himself impeache[d] [the narrow definition] as improper and g[ave] full recognition to the 
broad meaning of the word.”183  Indeed, since the narrow definition was used perhaps 
occasionally, with the broad definition of “crime” being used more regularly, the use of 
narrow definition would have been clear only if it was juxtaposed in the text with a word 
                                                 
177  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970). 
178  Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904). 
179  Id. at 69-70 (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES 5). 
180 Id. 
181 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“[T]he trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by 
jury.”). 
182  Schick, 195 U.S. at 70.  Such a reading of the actions at the Constitutional Convention was also set forth 
in an influential article by Felix Frankfurter and Thomas G. Corcoran a couple of decades later.  See Felix 
Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by 
Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917, 978-79 (1926) (citing Schick, 195 U.S. at 70).   
183 George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 260 (1958). 
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such as “misdemeanors.”184  Moreover, even if the word “crime” had two viable meanings 
and even if the Framers had selected the narrow definition at the Constitutional 
Convention, the Framers did no such thing when it came to the Sixth Amendment.  
Instead, the Sixth Amendment’s “criminal prosecutions” language mirrors the original 
“criminal offenses” language in Article III, which the Court had seen as embodying the 
broader definition of “crime.”  Finally, the use of the word “all” in the Sixth Amendment 
predicate also undermines the notion that the predicate was meant to be limited to a subset 
of prosecutions.185 
 
In addition, the Court’s problematic interpretation of the predicate clause in the jury trial 
context also stemmed from the Court’s misreading of the historical record.  In a series of 
cases long before the right to a jury trial was incorporated to the states, the Court had 
noted, often in dicta, that the common law and the practices of the colonies and early states 
showed that petty trials were often tried summarily and that the right to a jury trial, 
therefore, was not meant to extend to petty crimes.186  The historical record, however, does 
not support such a thesis.  While it is undoubtedly true that petty crimes were subject to 
summary trials during the common law, so were non-petty crimes.187  Moreover, as far as 
the colonies go, many either had no constitutional right to a jury trial or had limited that 
right to serious crimes or even capital cases.188  Furthermore, where summary trials did 
take place, “the power to dispense with the criminal jury had been reserved to the 
legislature . . . .”189 
 
Most importantly, whatever the practice of the common law, colonies or early states, the 
concerns that led to the adoption of the Bill of rights were directed narrowly at a central 
government, one that was feared might become potentially oppressive or tyrannical.  That 
is, the federal government stood on different footing and, even if states, which were 
primarily responsible for crime and safety, retained the power to dispense with juries for 
petty crimes, such power would not have been warranted for the federal government.  In 
fact, none of the federal crimes in existence when the Sixth Amendment was ratified was 
petty.190 
 
Nor is the Court’s textually inconsistent construction of the Predicate Clause defensible on 
policy grounds.  It is evident that the Court’s desire to limit the scope of the Predicate 
Clause in the counsel and jury trial contexts was motivated by a desire to minimize the 
                                                 
184 Id. at 258-59. 
185 Id. at 259-60. 
186  District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904); Natal 
v. Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621 (1891); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).  See also Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 
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supra Note 182. 
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189  Id. at 257. 
190 See Appendix A. 
26 THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE 
 
costs on states.191  The Court could certainly have imposed such a restriction on state 
prosecutions under a theory of refined incorporation – it could have expressly chosen to 
not incorporate the “in all criminal prosecutions” predicate and instead to require the rights 
to jury trial and counsel are fundamental only in subsets of criminal prosecutions in state 
courts.192  With respect to federal prosecutions, however, this type of “weighing” had 
already been done by the Framers, who “decided that the value of a jury trial far 
outweighed its costs for ‘all crimes’ and ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions.’”193   
 
Perhaps it was this poor textual interpretation and historical record that led Justice Black to 
conclude that, by reading a six month limitation into the jury trial right, the Court was 
engaging in “judicial mutilation of our written Constitution”194 and simply legislating “that 
‘all crimes’ did not mean ‘all crimes,’ but meant only ‘all serious crimes.”195 
 
Since the Court’s entangled reading of the “all criminal prosecutions” clause is neither 
textually supported nor historically faithful, the Court should disentangle this clause.  This 
would mean that all seven procedural rights of the Sixth Amendment, including the rights 
to jury trial and counsel, would apply to all federal prosecutions.  For state prosecutions, 
since the predicate clause need not be incorporated to the states, the Court’s current 
limitations on the scope of the rights to jury trial and counsel would remain valid. 
 
B.  THE RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESS 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in “all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.”196  
While this text speaks plainly to the “process” for calling witnesses to the trial, not to the 
regulation of witnesses’ testimony after they come to court, the Court has read the right 
more broadly to include the defendant’s right to put on witnesses and the defendant’s right 
                                                 
191  See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 75 (Black, J., concurring) (the Court was “weighing the advantages to the 
defendant against the administrative inconvenience to the State inherent in a jury trial and magically 
concluding that the scale tips at six months’ imprisonment.”); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188-89 (Harlan, J., 
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Search of a Doctrine?, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71 (1979); Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and 
Constitutional Law, supra Note 12, at 1569. 
192 See Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra Note 171 (discussing the theory of 
refined incorporation). 
193  Id. 
194  Frank, 395 U.S. at 160 (Black, J., dissenting). 
195  Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 75 (Black, J., concurring). 
196  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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to testify.  As discussed below, this expansive interpretation has resulted in the entangling 
of the Sixth Amendment with due process concerns, paradoxically opening the door to a 
potentially restrictive and textually inconsistent reading of the Clause in the future. 
 
The entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause can be traced to the Court’s decision 
four decades ago in Washington v. Texas.197  In Washington, the Court was faced with a 
Texas statute that imposed a per se bar against the use of testimony by persons who 
participated in the crime with the defendant.198  As indicated by Justice Harlan’s 
concurring opinion, the Court could have easily resolved this case on due process grounds 
because the Fourteenth Amendment has traditionally been the source of constitutional 
constraints on a state’s evidentiary rules.199  Indeed, the Court noted that “the most basic 
ingredients of due process of law” include the right “to be heard in [one’s] defense,” which 
in turn includes “[t]he right to offer the testimony of witnesses.”200  Nevertheless, after 
determining that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was applicable to the 
States via the Fourteenth Amendment,201 the Court read the Compulsory Process clause 
expansively to include not only the right to the “process” for compelling the attendance of 
witnesses in court, but also the substantive right to have those witnesses testify.202  As 
such, the Court located the right to have witnesses testify in both the Due Process and 
Compulsory Process clauses thereby entangling the Sixth Amendment.203 
 
                                                 
197  388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
198  Id. at 23. 
199  Id. at 25 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the Texas statute is unconstitutional because due process 
forbids the arbitrary exclusion of relevant and competent evidence). 
200  Id. at 18-19 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)).   
201 Id. at 18 (Noting that the Court had previously found that the Sixth Amendment rights to counsel, speedy 
trial, public trial and confrontation were “so fundamental and essential to a fair trial that [they were] 
incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment” and holding that the right to 
compulsory process “stands on no lesser footing . . . .”) 
202  Id. at 14-15.  As the Court has subsequently explained, it is reluctant to read new rights into the Due 
Process clause: 
In the field of criminal law, we “have defined the category of infractions that violate ‘fundamental 
fairness' very narrowly” based on the recognition that, “[b]eyond the specific guarantees enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process Clause has limited operation.”  The Bill of Rights speaks in 
explicit terms to many aspects of criminal procedure, and the expansion of those constitutional 
guarantees under the open-ended rubric of the Due Process Clause invites undue interference with 
both considered legislative judgments and the careful balance that the Constitution strikes between 
liberty and order. . . . “[I]t has never been thought that [decisions under the Due Process Clause] 
establish this Court as a rule-making organ for the promulgation of state rules of criminal 
procedure.” 
Medina, 505 U.S. at 443-44 (citations omitted).  As this Article demonstrates, however, the impulse to 
provide a more concrete bearing for a constitutional right by locating it in the Sixth Amendment may 
ironically work to undermine the Sixth Amendment’s procedural protections. 
203 In subsequent years, the Court, citing to its decision in Washington, similarly entangled the Compulsory 
Process clause with due process issues in Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986), and Holmes v. South 
Carolina, 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
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The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause contravenes the Clause’s 
text and history.204  The Sixth Amendment’s text speaks narrowly of the “process” for 
obtaining witnesses – that is, the issuance of subpoenas; it says nothing about the 
regulation of the witnesses’ testimony after they come to court.  Such a restrictive reading 
of the text is consonant with the Clause’s history.  The Framers had soundly rejected a 
proposal that the compulsory process language be expanded to include the right to a 
continuance if the process had been granted but not served – the proposal mustered support 
of less than a fifth of the Framers.205  As a Framer noted, “if process was issued, “the 
Government did all it could; the remainder must lie in the discretion of the court.””206  The 
Washington Court addressed neither the limited nature of the text nor the Clause’s history.  
Instead, the Court first engaged in a lengthy, but inapposite, discussion of common law 
principles concerning restrictions on the testimony of defense witnesses.207  The Court then 
stated that “[t]he Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of 
giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he 
had no right to use”208 and accordingly struck down the Texas statute.  The Court’s 
conclusion, however, was misguided because it ignored the role of the Due Process clause 
that, as the Court itself had recognized, included the right to have witnesses testify.  As a 
result, the Framers did not commit a “futile act:” while the Compulsory Process clause 
only gave defendants the narrow right to the issuance of subpoenas for the production of 
witnesses and documents,209 the Due Process clause granted defendants the ability to use 
such testimonial and documentary evidence.210 
 
The Court’s entanglement of the Compulsory Process Clause has also occurred in the 
context of a defendant’s right to testify.  In Rock v. Arkansas, the Court was called upon to 
determine the constitutionality of an Arkansas evidentiary rule that prohibited hypnotically 
refreshed testimony.211  The defendant was hypnotized and wanted to take the stand after 
her memory had been refreshed.212  Although relying principally on the Due Process 
                                                 
204 The Court’s entangled reading of the Compulsory Process Clause also was inconsistent with the structure 
of the Bill of Rights.  As the Court had noted, the most elemental notions of due process included the 
substantive right to have defense witnesses testify.  In locating the same right in the Compulsory Process 
clause, the Court failed to give independent meaning to the Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment and the Sixth 
Amendment.   
205 Joshua Dressler & George C. Thomas, III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND 
PERSPECTIVES 1192 (3d ed. 2006) (citing 1 Annals of Cong. 756 (1789)). 
206 Id. 
207 The discussion of common law principles, while relevant to the (due process) question of whether it was 
permissible for a state to create per se rules excluding entire classes of defense testimony, was not relevant to 
the underlying question of whether the Compulsory Process Clause included two rights:  the right to issue 
subpoenas and the right to have the witnesses actually testify. 
208  388 U.S. at 18.   
209 United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 (1807). 
210 This is not to suggest that Due Process grants defendants an unlimited right to have witnesses testify.  The 
admissibility and use of evidence are governed by state and federal rules of evidence, which in turn are 
bounded by due process considerations. 
211  483 U.S. 44, 45 (1987).   
212 Id. at 46-47. 
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Clause to find that the total exclusion of the hypnotic testimony was unconstitutional, the 
Court also held that there is a compulsory process right to testify on one’s own behalf.213   
 
Finally, the Court entangled the Compulsory Process Clause in the context of an accused’s 
right to offer a defense.  In Holmes v. South Carolina, the Court faulted the trial court for 
excluding the defendant’s evidence that a third party had committed the crime. 214  Since 
the right to be heard is a critical element of due process,215 the Court could have based its 
decision on the Due Process clause.  But the Court did not do so.  Instead, it cited both the 
Due Process clause and the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process clause.216 
 
The danger posed by the Court’s entanglement of the Confrontation Clause is illustrated by 
Taylor v. Illinois.217  In Taylor, the trial court had excluded a defense witness’ testimony as 
a penalty for the defense counsel’s willful violation of a state discovery rule.218  As the 
state had argued, the Court could easily have held that the exclusion did not violate the 
defendant’s compulsory process right because the defendant was not denied the 
government’s assistance in compelling the witness’ attendance at trial.219  Such an 
approach would have been consistent with the plain meaning of the text and the Clause’s 
history.  Instead, the Court adhered to its broad reading of the Clause, reiterating that it 
also gives defendants the right to present a defense.220  The Court, however, found that the 
Compulsory Process Clause had not been violated because the right to present a defense is 
not absolute; it must be balanced against “[t]he integrity of the adversary process, which 
depends both on the presentation of reliable evidence and the rejection of unreliable 
evidence, the interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice, and the potential 
prejudice to the truth-determining function of the trial process.”221  The Court, thus, 
incorporated a limitation into a textually unqualified right to compulsory process. 
 
The Court’s incorporation of a limiting principle has opened the door to a future restrictive 
reading of the Confrontation Clause.  Consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court 
                                                 
213  See id. at 52-53 (arguing that there is also a Fifth Amendment right to testify on one’s own behalf). 
214 547 U.S. 319 (2006). 
215 Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. at 18-19 (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948)). 
216 Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324 (““Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the 
Constitution guarantees criminal defendants ‘a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.’ ””) 
(citation omitted). 
217  484 U.S. 400 (1988). 
218 Id. at 418. 
219  This does not mean, however, that the trial court’s actions were constitutionally acceptable.  On the 
contrary, a credible argument can be made that the Court should have overturned the conviction and ordered 
a new trial under a robust reading of the Due Process clause:  if the evidence being offered was relevant and 
reliable, its exclusion would violate the defendant’s right to present a defense and to be heard, especially 
since there were alternate means of addressing any harm from the discovery violation, such as granting a 
continuance, and since it was possible to punish the attorney personally for the discovery violation instead of 
punishing the client.  
220 484 U.S. at 408-09. 
221  Id. at 414-15.  
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could find that a trial court’s refusal to issue a subpoena does not violate the Confrontation 
Clause if, using a balancing approach, the trial court had deemed the potential witness to 
be unreliable.  That is, the same rationale that has allowed the Court to expand the meaning 
of the Confrontation Clause turns out to be the means for a potential contraction of the 
Clause. 
 
To avoid such a potential undermining of the express, unlimited language of the 
Compulsory Process Clause, the Court should disentangle the Sixth Amendment and revert 
to a narrow reading of the Compulsory Process clause, leaving the resolution of all 
evidentiary issues to the Due Process clause.  Under such a reading, while the Compulsory 
Process Clause gives defendants the right to the issuance of subpoenas for compelling a 
witness’ attendance in court, once that witness shows up, it is the Due Process clause that 
addresses whether the witness will be allowed to testify.  Although such disentanglement 
would not result in a different outcome in any of the Court’s Compulsory Process clause 
decisions (because due process principles would support the same resolution by the Court), 
it would safeguard against future contraction and lead to a doctrine that is more faithful to 
the text and more historically sound.   
 
Such a disentangled approach is reflected in the Court’s decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie 
where the Court was asked to decide whether the Compulsory Process Clause requires the 
state to disclose possible exculpatory evidence.222  The Court chose to resolve the 
defendant’s claim using due process principles “[b]ecause the applicability of the Sixth 
Amendment to this type of case is unsettled, and because our Fourteenth Amendment 
precedents addressing the fundamental fairness of trials establish a clear framework for 
review . . . .”223   
 
C. THE RIGHT TO A PUBLIC TRIAL 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a . . . public trial.”224  Despite this unequivocal guarantee,225 the Court has 
                                                 
222 480 U.S. 39, 42-43 (1987). 
223  Id. at 56.  The Court added that “[a]lthough we conclude that compulsory process provides no greater 
protections in this area than those afforded by due process, we need not decide today whether and how the 
guarantees of the Compulsory Process Clause differ from those of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id.  
224  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See Aron Goldschneider, Choose Your Poison: A Comparative Constitutional 
Analysis of Criminal Trial Closure v. Witness Disguise in the Context of Protecting Endangered Witnesses at 
Trial, 15 GEO. MASON. U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 25, 30, n.22 (2004) (noting that “[t]he public trial right applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968)).  
Goldschneider also notes that the Oliver Court argued that “without exception all courts have held that an 
accused is at the very least entitled to have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what 
offense he is charged.” Id. (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271-72).  See also Amar, Sixth Amendment 
First Principles, supra Note 148, at 678 (arguing that under the Anglo-American tradition, a trial that is not 
public is no trial at all). 
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opened the door to the possibility that a trial may be held in closed proceedings over a 
defendant’s objection.226  As discussed below, this textually inconsistent, and entirely 
avoidable, result stems from an improper entanglement of the Sixth Amendment with Due 
Process considerations.  
 
The Court’s entanglement of the Public Trial Clause can be traced to its decision in Waller 
v. Georgia, where the Court was asked to consider whether “the accused’s Sixth 
Amendment right to a public trial extend[s] to a suppression hearing conducted prior to the 
presentation of evidence to the jury[.]”227  The answer should have been a simple “No.”  
The Sixth Amendment’s text after all unambiguously states that the right to public 
proceedings has to be provided at “trial.”  There is nothing in the text that provides for this 
right to public proceedings prior to or after a trial. 
 
Instead, in an opinion written for a unanimous Court by Justice Powell, the Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial does extend to pre-trial proceedings.228  In 
doing so, the Court drew support from a line of First Amendment cases that recognized 
that the press and public had a qualified First Amendment right to attend a criminal trial, 
including voir dire proceedings during jury selection.229  The Court then used a simple 
syllogism:  Since the press and public have a qualified right to attend pretrial suppression 
hearings under the First Amendment and since the Sixth Amendment public trial right is at 
least as protective as the First Amendment rights of the press and public, therefore the 
Sixth Amendment public trial right applies to suppression hearings.230  The Court also 
noted that its holding is consistent with the purposes of the right to a public trial, namely 
that it allows the public to see that the defendant “is fairly dealt with and not unjustly 
condemned,” that it encourages the “judge and prosecutor [to] carry out their duties 
responsibly,” and that it “encourages witnesses to come forward and discourages 
                                                                                                                                                    
225 This is not to say that all parts of trials must be open to the public and press.  “[C]ertain portions of a trial, 
such as sidebar conferences and in-chambers conferences, may routinely be kept confidential.”  Sixth 
Amendment at Trial, 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 608, 614 (2006). 
226  A corollary issue raised by the public trial guarantee is whether a trial can be held in open proceedings 
over a defendant’s objection – that is, whether defendants have unlimited ability to waive public trials.  
While the Court has held that trials may indeed be held open over the defendant’s objection, this 
jurisprudence is not inconsistent with Constitutional text.  This is because the issue implicates not only a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights but also the First Amendment rights of the press and the public.  In light 
of competing textual mandates, the Court properly held that a resolution of the issue should be predicated on 
a balancing of the two Constitutional provisions.  Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) (citing 
United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919, 924 (3rd Cir. 1949).     
227  467 U.S. 39, 43 (1984). 
228  Id. at 48. 
229  Id. at 44-45 (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).). 
230  Id. at 44-46 (citations omitted).   
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perjury.”231  Finally, the Court pointed to the similarities in benefits from open proceedings 
at suppression hearings and trials.232 
 
Completely absent from the Court’s reasoning was any discussion of the plain limiting 
language of the Sixth Amendment that the right is to a public “trial.”  This is not surprising 
because the text proves to be an insurmountable obstacle.  Since the right to a public 
proceeding is limited to a “trial,” the only way to ground the decision in the text would be 
to argue that a “trial” includes pre-trial proceedings.  Such a position, however, is not 
tenable.  In addition to the right to a public trial, two other Sixth Amendment rights are 
expressly limited to the context of trials – the rights to speedy trial and jury trial.  It is 
unimaginable that the Court would agree that these rights could be extended to pre-trial 
proceedings, by holding either that defendants are entitled to have pre-trial proceedings 
occur in a speedy manner or that pre-trial proceedings ought to be conducted before juries.  
The only alternative for the Court would have been to find some limiting principle that 
would allow it to extend one trial-specific right to pre-trial proceedings while not 
extending the others.  There is no such limiting principle.  Simply put, not only is there no 
textual support in the Sixth Amendment for the Court’s decision, but the text of the Sixth 
Amendment actually undermines the Court’s holding. 
 
This is not to say that there are no constitutional bases for requiring that pre-trial or post-
trial proceedings be open.  There are.  These can be found in the Due Process clauses of the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.  The Court, relying on practically the same grounds 
already laid out in its opinion, could have held that Due Process, rather than the right to a 
public trial, requires that suppression hearings and other pre-trial proceedings be conducted 
in the open.233  After all, the public trial interests identified by the Court – ensuring that 
defendants are dealt with fairly, encouraging proper conduct by judges and prosecutors, 
encouraging witnesses to come forward and testify truthfully234 – are all consonant with 
fundamental due process interests of ensuring a fair hearing before a neutral 
decisionmaker.235 
 
This argument – that the Court erred in locating its ruling in the Sixth Amendment instead 
of the Fourteenth Amendment – is not a matter of mere semantics.  There is a real danger 
in the Court’s entangling a due process issue with the Sixth Amendment.  This is because 
                                                 
231  Id. at 46 (citations omitted) 
232  Id. at 46-47.  See also Lewis F. Weakland, Confusion in the Courthouse: The Legacy of the Gannett and 
Richmond Newpapers Public Right to Access Cases, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 603, 615 (1986) (arguing that the 
Court employed a functional analysis without even considering whether pretrial suppression hearings were 
traditionally open). 
233  While it is true that a free-standing Fourteenth Amendment due process claim was not raised by the 
parties, the Court has in the past resolved cases on grounds not raised by the parties.  In any event, the Court 
could have asked the parties for further briefing on this issue had it wanted to.  
234  Waller, 467 U.S. at 46. 
235 See Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992) (“The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates 
even the minimal standards of due process.”) (citation omitted); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) 
(“A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.”) 
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the Court has adopted the First Amendment ‘balancing of interests’ jurisprudence in 
holding that there are circumstances in which the right to public pre-trial proceedings may 
be overridden.236  That is, notwithstanding the fact that the Sixth Amendment does not in 
any way qualify the right to a public trial, the Court held that pre-trial proceedings may be 
closed in certain circumstances.  Now, had the Court limited this qualification of the right 
to a public hearing to pre-trial proceedings and kept the right to public trial unfettered, 
there would have been little issue.  But, the Court drew no such line.  Therefore, 
notwithstanding the absence of any limiting language in the text of the Sixth Amendment, 
the Court’s balancing of interests approach allows for a closure of trials over the 
defendant’s objection as much as it allows the closure of pre-trial proceedings.237  The fear 
of this textually inconsistent construction of the Sixth Amendment is not a merely 
theoretical concern.  Already, state and lower federal courts have applied the First 
Amendment standard to close portions of trials in clear contravention of the plain language 
of the Sixth Amendment.238   
 
                                                 
236  Waller, 467 U.S. at 47 (“[W]e hold that under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing 
over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in Press-Enterprise and its predecessors.”).  In 
the First Amendment context, the Court has held that the presumption that the trial be open to the press and 
public may be overridden “by an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve 
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).  The Court has subsequently added that there are “two 
complementary consideration” – “whether the place and process have historically been open to the press and 
general public” and “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the 
particular process in question.”  Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California for Riverside County 
(Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).   
237  See Thomas G. Stacy, The Constitution in Conflict: Espionage Prosecutions, the Right to Present a 
Defense, and the States Secret Privilege, 58 U. COLO. L. REV. 177, 251 (1987) (“Waller implicitly holds that, 
as in the first amendment context, a prospective witness’ or juror’s privacy interests may overcome a 
defendant’s qualified sixth amendment right to a public trial in certain circumstances.”).  Instead of this 
textually inconsistent approach, the Court should recognize that defendants have an absolute right to insist on 
a public trial and that the denial of this right would be a structural error, one that is not amenable to harmless 
error analysis.  See State v. Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (“The violation of the 
constitutional right to a public trial is a structural error, not subject to harmless error analysis.” (citations 
omitted)). 
238  See, e.g., Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 69-72 (2d Cir. 1997) (employing the Press-Enterprise I 
standard to uphold the trial court’s closure of the trial during the testimony of a witness); State v. 
Washington, 755 N.E.2d 422, 424-25 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (ordering a new trial after finding that the trial 
court improperly applied the Press-Enterprise I standard to close the courtroom during the testimony of one 
witness at trial).  See also Sixth Amendment at Trial, 35 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 608, 612-14 (2006) 
(“Federal courts have expanded the applicability of the Press-Enterprise I test beyond the voir dire and trial 
stages. . . .  Courts have applied the Press Enterprise I test to closures of suppression hearings and post-trial 
examinations of jurors for potential misconduct.  Courts have also applied the Press Enterprise I test to the 
sealing of documents, including those that support search warrants and plea agreements, as well as 
documents stemming from electronic surveillance.  In addition, courts have applied the Press Enterprise I test 
to the sealing of records of criminal proceedings, including post-trial motions.”); Goldschneider, supra Note 
224, at 37 (“Closure of criminal trials is New York is exceedingly commonplace . . . .”); Randolph N. 
Jonakait, Secret Testimony and Public Trials in New York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 407 (1998) (“New 
York leads the country in denying public trials.”).   
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The danger stemming from the Court’s introduction of a new balancing of interests is 
accentuated by the factors that are involved in the balancing process.  As noted earlier, not 
all balancing of interests are alien to the Sixth Amendment.  For instance, when a 
defendant seeks to waive the right to a public trial, there arises a conflict between two 
constitutional provisions – the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and the First 
Amendment rights of the public and the press to attend trials.  In such circumstances, a 
balancing of competing constitutional interests is unavoidable.  The Court’s decision in 
Waller, however, involves balancing of a different type.  Under the Waller framework, a 
defendant’s right to a public trial may be denied after balancing that constitutional right 
against non-constitutional interests.239   
 
Thus, the unnecessary entanglement of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial with 
due process considerations has opened the door to a contraction of an otherwise robust 
procedural protection afforded by the Sixth Amendment.  The Court’s failure to ground the 
right to public pre-trial proceedings in the due process clause led it needlessly to locate that 
right in the Sixth Amendment.  While the Court’s concurrent adoption of First Amendment 
balancing of interests jurisprudence to allow for the closure of pre-trial proceedings in 
some circumstances would not have posed a problem under due process analysis,240 its use 
in the Sixth Amendment is fundamentally at odds with the unqualified text of the 
Amendment and leads to an undermining of a critical safeguard of liberty.  
 
D.  THE RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL 
 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all defendants the right to a speedy trial.241  Despite the 
fact that this text speaks solely to the timeliness of the trial, the Court has held that, 
notwithstanding the length or reasons for the delay, there may likely be no violation of the 
right to a speedy trial unless a defendant has been prejudiced by the delay.242  As discussed 
                                                 
239 As the Waller Court recognized, First Amendment cases make clear “that the right to an open trial may 
give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the 
government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information.”  467 U.S. at 45.  The Court has also 
clarified that in this balancing process, “the interests of those other than the accused may be implicated. The 
protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify closing 
certain aspects of a criminal proceeding.”  Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 n.2.   
240 Due process considerations have traditionally involved the weighing of all interests, including non-
constitutional interests.  See, e.g., Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 
(1990) (“[D]etermining that a person has a “liberty interest” under the Due Process Clause does not end the 
inquiry; “whether respondent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined by balancing his 
liberty interests against the relevant state interests.”); Superintendent, Massachusetts Correctional Institution, 
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985) (“The requirements of due process are flexible and depend on a 
balancing of the interests affected by the relevant government action.”). 
241 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
242 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972).  The Court also held that another factor involved in 
determining a speedy trial claim is whether the defendant asserted that right.  Id.  As the Court recognized, 
the inclusion of this factor constitutes a departure from the general rule against the use of silence to infer 
waiver of a constitutional right.  Id.  For example, the Court has held that the right to counsel applies 
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below, this textually inconsistent result is a consequence of an improper entanglement of 
the Sixth Amendment.  
 
Prior to entanglement, the Court held that the speedy trial right was meant to guard against 
“undue and oppressive incarceration” and the “anxiety and concern accompanying public 
accusation.”243  To protect this “impairment of liberty,” federal courts, prior to 
incorporation, imposed a mechanical rule for speedy trial violations.244  This rule applied 
irrespective of the reasons for the delay or whether the defendant was prejudiced.245   
 
However, during the early years of the Burger Court, the Court in Barker v. Wingo adopted 
a four-part balancing test and altered the focus of the speedy trial right from the protection 
of liberty to the preservation of reliable and accurate verdicts.246  In Barker, the Court held 
that the delay of five and one-half years between the period of arrest and trial did not 
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right.247  The Court’s remarkable248 
finding that a multiple-year delay was speedy lies might be explained by two factors.  First, 
Barker is a case where “bad facts make bad law.”249  The first section of the Justice 
Powell’s majority opinion begins with a summary of the crime: “On July 20, 1958, in 
Christian County, Kentucky, an elderly couple was beaten to death by intruders wielding 
an iron tire tool.”250  Second, although suggesting that the remedy for a violation of the 
right to a speedy trial—dismissal of the indictment with prejudice251—is an 
“unsatisfactorily severe remedy,” the Barker Court nevertheless accepted that that “it is the 
only possible remedy.”252  To avoid the possibility that a defendant convicted of a brutal 
murder would walk free, the Court had to construct a constitutional justification, which 
came from the adoption of a due process prejudice requirement.253 
                                                                                                                                                    
regardless of the defendant’s request for the assistance of counsel.  See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 
404 (1977) (“[T]he right to counsel does not depend upon a request by the defendant.”); Carnley v. Cochran, 
369 U.S. 506, 513 (1962) (“[W]here the assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be 
furnished counsel does not depend on a request.”)  See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) 
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this factor does not involve entanglement issues, a discussion of its merits is beyond the scope of this Article. 
243  United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971).   
244  See Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 153 (discussing United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880)). 
245  Id.   
246  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33.   
247 407 U.S. at 514. 
248 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 538 
(1975) (“To debate the question whether the sixth amendment has been violated in such egregious cases as 
these . . . is itself to make a feeble farce of the amendment.”) 
249  See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that “bad facts 
make bad law.”).   
250  Barker, 407 U.S. at 516.   
251  See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (holding that dismissal of the indictment is the 
remedy for a violation of the speedy trial right).   
252  Barker, 407 U.S. 522. 
253  Commentators have noted that the intersection of these two factors may well explain why the Court held 
that a five and one-half year period did not violate the defendant’s right to a speedy trial.  Thomas III, supra 
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Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Powell began by asserting that the speedy trial right 
is “generically different” from any other constitutional right.254  The uniqueness of the 
right, according to Justice Powell, lies in its vagueness, amorphous nature, remedy, and the 
fact that the public benefits from the right adversely to the defendant.255  The Sixth 
Amendment, however, “contains a number of items which the defendant might willingly 
forego and upon which the state might insist.”256  The truer sense of the uniqueness to 
which Justice Powell refers is the remedy, which he finds “unsatisfactory when viewed in 
the light of the ‘amorphous quality of the right.’”257 
 
Prior to setting out the standard for a speedy trial violation, Justice Powell rejected two 
“rigid” attempts made by lower courts to provide certainty to the otherwise “slippery” 
right.258  The first suggested approach would require the Court to adopt a mechanical time 
limit, which Justice Powell rejected out of hand, as it would require the Court to “engage 
in legislative or rulemaking activity.”259  The second suggested approach was the 
“demand-waiver doctrine,” which would require waiver unless the defendant demands a 
speedy trial.260  Justice Powell also rejected this suggestion as inconsistent with Court’s 
holdings that waiver of a constitutional right may not be waived without consent.261  
Although rejecting these two approaches, the Court nonetheless incorporated each in its 
four-part balancing standard.262    
 
Under the adopted Barker standard, the consideration of a violation is “triggered” by a 
“presumptively prejudicial” lengthy delay.263  Whether the length of delay is 
presumptively prejudicial will, according to the Court, vary depending on the “peculiar 
circumstances of the case.”264   If the length triggers this presumption, a court must then 
consider the reason for the delay.265  Next, a court must consider whether the defendant 
asserts the right, because, as Justice Powell argues, the more that a defendant is prejudiced 
                                                                                                                                                    
Note 3, at 227-28 (“Apparently recognizing the difficulty in classifying as ‘speedy’ a trial that occurs five 
and one-half years after Barker was arrested, the unanimous Court spoke mostly in terms of whether the 
delay caused doubt about the accuracy of the outcome, about whether the defendant’s case was prejudiced by 
the delay.”).   
254  Barker, 407 U.S. at 519.   
255  Id. at 519-22. 
256  See generally H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 
1376, 1379 (1972) (calling into question the asserted uniqueness of the speedy trial right).  
257  Id. at 1381.   
258  Barker, 407 U.S. at 522.   
259  Id. at 523.  
260  Id. at 525.   
261  Id. 
262  Id. at 530.   
263 Baker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
264  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-31. 
265 Id. at 531. 
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by the delay, the more likely she will make a demand for a speedy trial.266  Finally, a court 
should consider whether the delay prejudiced the defense.267  
 
The adoption of the prejudice requirement signaled a radical shift in the Court’s speedy 
trial jurisprudence.  As noted above, prior to Barker the Court had held that the purpose of 
the speedy trial right is to protect a defendant’s liberty interests.268  Although Justice 
Powell acknowledges this purpose, he nevertheless claims that “the most serious” interest 
is to “limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired,” which if not protected, 
“skews the fairness of the entire system” and affects the outcome.269  Prejudice, however, 
is “a rationale that has as its goal accuracy rather than simply the provision of the ‘speedy 
trial’ the Sixth Amendment guarantees.”270  By relying on “accuracy” and “prejudice,” 
therefore, the Court entangled the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right with traditional due 
process concerns.         
 
A more faithful interpretation of the speedy trial right would require eliminating Barker’s 
prejudice requirement.271  Such an approach is suggested by Justice Souter’s majority and 
Justice Thomas’ dissenting opinions in Doggett v. United States.272  In Doggett, the Court 
found that the defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right was violated when, 
unbeknownst to the defendant, more than eight years lapsed between the time of his 
indictment and the time of his arrest.273  Writing for the majority, Justice Souter relied on 
both the length between indictment and arrest and the government’s negligence in 
prosecuting the defendant.274  Although the defendant was unable to show specific 
prejudice from the delay, the Court made its holding consistent with Barker by 
                                                 
266 Id. at 531-32. 
267  Id. at 532.   
268 See supra text accompanying Note 243. 
269  Id.  
270  Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 163.  
271  Professor Thomas has a similar thesis in which in call for disentangling the Sixth Amendment speedy 
trial right from the Due Process Clause.  Thomas, supra Note 3, at 231.  However, Professor Thomas argues 
that this disentanglement should only occur at federal trials, as opposed to state trials, which he argues should 
be decided solely under the Due Process Clause.  Id. at 229.  In other words, Professor Thomas proposes that 
the same procedural right have different meanings in federal courts and in state courts.  This Article suggests 
instead that each of the Sixth amendment’s seven procedural provisions means the same in any context.  The 
Article, does, however, suggest that the predicate clause preceding the seven procedural protections in the 
Sixth Amendment, which speaks only to the scope of the rights not to their substantive meaning, need not 
have been incorporated along with the procedural right.  So, for example, it would have been proper for the 
Court to hold that the right to counsel applies to all federal prosecutions as the text of the sixth Amendment 
demand, but only applies to state prosecutions for felonies and those misdemeanors that result in the 
imposition of a term of imprisonment because, under due process, the right to counsel is only critical to 
fundamental fairness in these state court proceedings.  
272  505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
273 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 649-50. 
274 Id. at 657-58. 
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“invent[ing] a presumptive prejudice arising from a delay of that length,”275 which, Justice 
Souter argued, “compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove 
or, for that matter, identify.”276   Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice Scalia in dissent, however, proposed a more fundamental shift in the Court’s 
Speedy Trial jurisprudence.  They argued that the prejudice requirement, which is more 
properly the concern of the Due Process Clause,277 should be eliminated and that the 
protection of liberty be restored as the principal protection of the speedy trial.278   
 
Under a disentangled reading of the Speedy Trial clause, therefore, a violation would rest 
on the showing that the state failed to prosecute an accused279 in a speedy fashion and the 
reason for the delay was not prompted by the defendant’s request.280  Once a defendant 
makes this showing, the burden should shift to the prosecution to show that the violation 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  Such a test would have the virtue of comporting 
with other Sixth Amendment rights and mitigating the seemingly unjustifiable remedy of 
dismissing an indictment with prejudice.  Moreover, by removing the prejudice 
requirement, the Court could restore the plain meaning of the right to a speedy trial and 
disentangle the speedy trial right from the Due Process Clause, which would apply solely 
to preaccusation delays.281   
 
E.  THE RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”282  This Confrontation 
Clause has been understood to involve at its core four procedural safeguards, including the 
right to a face-to-face confrontation.283  The Court, however, has held that the right to face-
to-face confrontation is not absolute and that public policy considerations may supersede 
the constitutional right in some circumstances.284  As discussed below, this elevation of 
                                                 
275  Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 229.  See also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655 (“Thus, we generally have to 
recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party 
can prove or, for that matter, identify.”).   
276  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655. 
277  See id. at 666 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
278  See id. at 660-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Ultimately, Justice Thomas would have denied relief because 
the defendant suffered no harm to his liberty interest.  Id. at 666 n.4. 
279  See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) (holding that the right attaches when “the putative 
defendant in some way becomes an ‘accused.’”); Doggett, 505 U.S. at 662 (arguing that the prejudice 
standard should govern the period between crime and trial). 
280  The use of the word speedy indicates that the length of time should vary with the factors involved in 
individual prosecutions, rather than establishing a one size fits all approach to every type of prosecution.  
Professor Thomas makes a similar argument; however, he would rest a violation solely on a showing of 
delay, “within six months or so.”  Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 228.   
281  See Amsterdam, supra Note 248, at 528.  
282 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
283 Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845-46 (1990). 
284  See id. at 849-50. 
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public policy over the plain text of the Sixth Amendment has been the result of an 
entanglement of the Confrontation Clause with due process concerns of reliability of the 
verdict.   
 
The groundwork for the Court’s entanglement of this aspect of the Confrontation Clause 
was laid in the Court’s decision in Coy v. Iowa.285  In Coy, the Court considered a statute 
that permitted a court to place a screen between the victim of sexual abuse and the 
defendant that, once adjustments to the lighting were made, allowed the defendant to see 
the witness but the witness not to see the defendant.286  Arguing that the “irreducible literal 
meaning of the Clause” is to ensure face-to-face confrontation, the Court held that the use 
of the screen violated the Confrontation Clause.287  While Justice O’Connor wrote a 
concurring opinion recognizing exceptions to this rule,288 the majority opinion by Justice 
Scalia noted that “[w]e leave for another day, however, the question whether any 
exceptions exist.”289   
 
Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig, the Court directly addressed exceptions to the 
Confrontation Clause’s requirement of face-to-face confrontation.290  In Craig, the Court 
was asked to decide the constitutionality of a Maryland statute that permitted the trial 
judge, after finding that the witness would be traumatized by testifying in open court, to 
allow that witness, a victim of child abuse, to testify in a separate room. 291  In addition, 
although the defendant was excluded from that room, attorneys from both sides were 
permitted to question the witness and the witness’ testimony was televised to the 
courtroom through a one-way closed circuit television.292  Writing for the majority, Justice 
O’Connor held that the Maryland statute did not violate the Confrontation Clause.293  
Justice O’Connor stated that the Confrontation Clause expresses only a “preference”294 for 
face-to-face confrontation and that the underlying purpose of such an encounter and of the 
other three elements of the Confrontation Clause (oath taking, cross-examination, and jury 
observance of witness demeanor) is to ensure reliability of the verdict.295  Justice 
O’Connor concluded, therefore, that if the trial is reliable, then a strict requirement of all of 
these elements would needlessly impede important public policies. 
 
The Court’s opinion in Craig, which used public policy considerations to limit the scope of 
an otherwise textually and historically unbounded constitutional provision, has been the 
                                                 
285  487 U.S. 1012 (1988). 
286  Id. at 1014-15.  
287  Id. at 1021.  See also Penny J. White, Rescuing the Confrontation Clause, 54 S.C. L. REV. 537, 612 
(2003). 
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289  Coy, 487 U.S. at 1021.  
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subject of considerable criticism.  Justice Scalia issued one of his more scathing dissents in 
Craig.  He attacked the majority’s analysis, which he argued “abstracts from the right to its 
purposes, and then eliminates the right.”296 Commentators have argued that Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion in Craig tears the presumption of innocence cloak;297 misses the forest 
for the trees by improperly balancing the costs of wrongful conviction against the benefits 
of eliminating face-to-face confrontation;298 and fails to provide a narrowly tailored 
exception for state interests.299   
 
More importantly, however, the Court’s analysis has led to the entanglement of the Sixth 
Amendment.  As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, “the Confrontation 
Clause does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that 
were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’ 
confrontation.”300  Reliability, on the other hand, is quintessentially a due process 
concern.301   
 
Disentangling the Confrontation Clause by reverting to the bright-line requirement of face-
to-face confrontation would restore the plain meaning and full protection of the 
Confrontation Clause.302  The prospect for such disentanglement appears more likely given 
                                                 
296  Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).  See Thomas III, supra Note 3, at 
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302  See Thomas III, supra note 3, at 227.  Professor Thomas argues that such disentanglement need only 
happen with respect to federal prosecutions; state prosecutions could continue to be governed by the Craig 
rule because state actions are limited by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause, not the Sixth 
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.  This Article proposes an alternate approach.  While it adheres to the 
traditional approach that those provisions of the Bill of Rights that have been incorporated have identical 
meanings under the Fourteenth Amendment, it recognizes that the Sixth Amendment’s “in all criminal 
prosecutions” predicate is not a substantive protection, but only one that goes to the scope of cases in which 
the procedural protections apply.  As such, since the concerns about a potentially oppressive or tyrannical 
government were directed more at the federal government than the States, it is entirely proper that when the 
provisions of the Sixth Amendment are made applicable to the states, the Court may circumscribe the 
universe of cases to which the provisions will apply.  In particular, the rights to a jury trial and counsel 
41 THE SIXTH AMENDMENT’S TEXTUAL CORE 
 
the Court’s recent decision in Crawford v. Washington where Justice Scalia wrote, while 
“the [Confrontation] Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, []it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands, not that evidence be reliable, 
but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner . . . .”303  This principle is equally 
applicable to the Court’s decision in Craig. 
 
F.  THE RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
 
The Sixth Amendment provides that all defendants have the right to assistance of 
counsel304 and this right to counsel has been recognized as being “the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.”305  This is because an ineffective counsel is “not functioning as the 
‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”306  Prior to the incorporation of the right 
to counsel, the Court had used the Fourteenth Amendment to require that, in cases where 
due process required the appointment of counsel, counsel provide effective assistance.307  
Since the Court’s landmark decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, the denial of effective 
assistance has been recognized as a violation of the Sixth Amendment.308  As discussed 
below, however, the Court has entangled this right to effective assistance by requiring that 
defendants demonstrate – not for purposes of determining whether relief is warranted once 
a violation is proved, but for purposes of determining whether the constitutional provision 
in fact has been violated – that the attorney’s performance affected the reliability of the 
verdict. 
 
During the last years of the Burger Court, the Supreme Court elaborated on the elements of 
the right to effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, establishing a two-
pronged standard for ineffective assistance of council claims.  The first prong requires the 
defendant to “show that counsel’s performance was deficient,” and  provides that counsel’s 
performance be evaluated using “prevailing professional norms,” that there should be a 
“strong presumption” of counsel’s reasonableness, and that, in reviewing strategic 
decisions, courts should apply a “heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.”309  
While much criticism has been directed as this prong of the Strickland test,310 it is not the 
focus of this Article because it does not involve any issue of entanglement. 
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Rather, it is the second prong of the Strickland standard that is the source of the 
entanglement of the right to counsel.  This prong requires the defendant to show that 
counsel’s deficiency was prejudicial to the defense.311  While prejudice may be presumed 
in some limited cases, as a general matter the defendant must “affirmatively prove 
prejudice,” which requires the defendant to demonstrate that “there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”312   
 
Strickland’s prejudice prong is problematic for purposes of this Article because it 
entangles the Sixth Amendment with traditional due process concerns.  Writing for the 
majority, Justice O’Connor stated that since “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists, 
and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial,”313 to satisfy the 
prejudice prong the defendant must show “counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial.”314  This reasoning led to the entanglement of the Sixth 
Amendment not only because the right to a fair trial has been seen as a distinctly due 
process right,315 but also because, rather than understanding a fair trial as being one in 
which the procedures used were fair, Justice O’Connor defined a fair trial as “a trial whose 
result is reliable.”316  Therefore, to establish a Sixth Amendment claim, the Court required 
defendants to demonstrate the unreliability of the verdict or sentence,317 a quintessentially 
due process consideration.318 
 
This entanglement has led to a textually challenged and historically unsound construction 
of the right to counsel.  While the text of the Sixth Amendment provides that the assistance 
of counsel be provided to defendants “in all criminal prosecutions,” the second prong 
                                                                                                                                                    
counsel are unpersuasive and “[a]ppropriately rigorous professional standards for appraising counsel's 
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effectively means that the assistance of counsel need only be provided in those 
prosecutions where there is a reasonable probability that defendants will receive a 
favorable verdict at guilt or sentencing.   
 
In addition, the Court’s entangled approach has reduced the prescriptive value of the right 
to counsel.  Whatever might be said of the Court’s approach in Strickland from an ex post 
perspective, the approach is deeply problematic from an ex ante perspective.  By failing to 
require an ex ante inquiry into whether “the defense is institutionally equipped to litigate as 
effectively as the prosecution”319 and by allowing reviewing courts to avoid assessing 
counsel’s competence by considering prejudice before performance,320 the Court has 
minimized the guidance provided by the right to counsel jurisprudence to members of the 
bar.321   
 
Moreover, limiting the right to counsel to those defendants who might be innocent is 
inconsistent with the fact the “Framers of the Bill of Rights intended them to be formidable 
barriers to the successful federal prosecution of criminal defendants, whether guilty or 
innocent.”322   
 
It is not surprising then that the Court’s approach has been roundly criticized for permitting 
horrendous lawyering;323 for making it difficult for defendants to prove violations in those 
cases where counsel failed miserably;324 for being too forgiving of failures to investigate or 
present mitigating evidence and for producing arbitrary reviews in capital cases;325 for 
making putting reviewing courts in the difficult position of having to determine from a 
cold record whether an outcome during the penalty phase would have been different;326 for 
creating an framework that allows reviewing courts to conflate the trial and sentencing 
phases under the prejudice analysis;327 for creating an almost “insurmountable hurdle for 
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defendants claiming ineffective assistance”;328 and for overemphasizing factual 
innocence.329 
 
The prospect for disentangling the right to counsel are bright330 in light of the Court’s 
recent decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, a case in which the Court was asked to 
“decide whether a trial court’s erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of 
counsel entitles him to a reversal of his conviction.”331  In response to the government’s 
claim that the defendant should be required to show that the substituted counsel’s 
performance prejudiced the defendant, i.e. that the defendant did not receive a fair trial, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, answered that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel of choice, “commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of 
fairness be provided--to wit, that the accused be defended by the counsel he believes to be 
best.”332  Justice Scalia further argued for disentanglement by claiming that “the right at 
stake here is the right to counsel of choice, not the right to a fair trial; and that right was 
violated because the deprivation of counsel was erroneous.”333   
 
In his Gonzalez-Lopez opinion, Justice Scalia also criticizes the Court’s earlier method of 
outlining the limits of certain Sixth Amendment rights from their purpose to provide a fair 
trial.334  As examples, Justice Scalia cites Ohio v. Roberts, in which the Court reasoned that 
the Confrontation Clause was not violated as long as the purpose of ensuring reliability 
was satisfied,335 and Maryland v. Craig, in which the Court “abstract[ed] from the right to 
its purposes, and then eliminate[d] the right.”336   Justice Scalia concedes that “the purpose 
of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial.”337  However, he 
concludes that “it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, 
on the whole, fair.”338  Instead, the Sixth Amendment rights have independent meaning 
and significance distinct from their purpose—the right to a fair trial.339    
 
In the ineffective assistance context, disentanglement would mean that prejudice should be 
eliminated from the showing necessary to establish a violation of the right to counsel.340   
                                                 
328  See Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for 
Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413, 427 (1988). 
329  See Duncan, supra Note 310, at 19.  But see Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986). 
330  See The Supreme Court, 2005 Term Leading Cases, Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel of Choice, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 203, 207-08 (2006). 
331  548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2560 (2006).   
332  Id. at 2561-62. 
333  Id. at 2562. 
334  Curiously, Justice Scalia noticed the tension between the Court’s ruling in Gonzalez-Lopez and 
its holding in Strickland, but dismissed the problem by focusing on the fair trial purpose of the right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  Id. at 2563.   
335  448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). 
336  497 U.S. 836, 862 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
337  Gonzalez- Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2562. 
338  Id.  
339  See id. at 2562.   
340  See Sixth Amendment – Right to Counsel of Choice, supra Note 330, at 210.  
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Instead, a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel should rest solely on demonstrating 
that the counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient.341  Once the defendant has 
made such a showing, the court should then address the issue of whether relief should be 
granted using its traditional approach to these issues.  That is, the court should apply the 
harmless error rule set forth in Chapman v. California.342  It bears emphasizing here that 
although the Chapman rule normally applies only on direct appeal, it should apply to all 
initial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, irrespective of the procedural posture of 
the case.343  This is because courts have not only held that defendants may properly bring 
an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on collateral attack,344 but in fact have 
required that such claims not be raised until collateral proceedings.345  Once the Chapman 
standard has been applied at the first collateral review, whether in state post-conviction or 
in federal habeas corpus proceedings, then courts could use the standard set forth in Brecht 
v. Abramson.346 
 
Using this approach will not only result in a textually sound and historically grounded 
disentangled reading of the right to counsel, but it would also lead to a proper re-aligning 
of the burdens of proof.  While the Strickland approach places the burden on the defendant 
for establishing that the counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial, under the 
harmless error approach, the burden would be on the government. 347  Such an approach 
would be consistent with the Court’s general approach to other non-structural 
constitutional errors,348 including non-structural violations of the right to counsel in other 
contexts.349  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Sixth Amendment, framed amidst deep misgivings about a potentially oppressive 
central government, mandates that the federal government provide all defendants seven 
fundamental procedural protections.  Over the course of the past few decades, the Supreme 
Court’s expansive and restrictive readings of the Sixth Amendment have led to 
constructions that are inconsistent with the Amendment’s text.  These problematic 
                                                 
341  See Gabriel, supra Note 317 at 1284; Geimer, supra Note 318, at 139. 
342  386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (requiring the government to prove that constitutional errors were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt).   
343  See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
344  Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). 
345  See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 450 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2006).  
346  507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (holding that on federal habeas corpus of constitutional errors, the standard is 
whether the error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” 
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). 
347  See DeCoster, 487 F.2d at 1204; Sixth Amendment—Right to Counsel of Choice, supra Note 330, at 212. 
348  See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 691 
(1986). 
349  See Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 258 (1988); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 232 (1977); 
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967). 
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readings, caused by entanglements of the Sixth Amendment with the Due Process clause, 
have led to diminished procedural protections against infringement of individual liberty.   
 
The Court’s recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence bears signs of the Court’s willingness 
to disentangle the Sixth Amendment and return to a textually grounded reading of the 
Amendment.  Were the Court to continue this project and disentangle of the various 
entanglements identified in this Article, it would do much to restore the Sixth 
Amendment’s robust role in protecting individual liberty as envisioned when it was 
adopted.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
Federal Crimes at the Time the Sixth Amendment was Ratified
350
 
 
Crime 1790 Punishment Current Punishment Current Code 
Treason Death 
Death; 5 years, 
$10,000 
18 U.S.C. § 
2381 
Murder Death 
First degree: Death or 
life; Second degree: 
Term or life  
18 U.S.C. § 
1111 
Piracy and felony Death Life 
18 U.S.C. § 
1651 
Accessories to piracy 
Before the fact Death n/a n/a 
Forgery and 
counterfeiting Death 20 years  18 U.S.C. § 471 
Rescue of a person 
convicted of a capital 
crime Death 25 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 753 
Misprision of treason 7 years, $1,000 7 years, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
2382 
Misprision of murder or 
felony 3 years, $500 3 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 4 
Manslaughter 3 years, $1,000 
Voluntary: 10 years, 
fine; Involuntary: 6 
years, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
1112 
Accessories to piracy 
after the fact 3 years, $500 n/a n/a 
Confederacy to become 
pirates 3 years, $1,000 3 years, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
1657 
Maiming on Unites 
States’ Property or on the 
high seas 7 years, $1,000 20 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 114 
Stealing or falsifying a 
record or process 
7 years, $5,000, 
39 stripes 5 years, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
1506 
Perjury 
3 years, $800, 1 
hour in the pillory 5 years, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
1621 
                                                 
350 Crimes Act of 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112 
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Crime 1790 Punishment Current Punishment Current Code 
Obstruction of process 1 year, $300 1 year, fine 
18 U.S.C. § 
1509 
Rescue of a person before 
trial 1 year, $500 5 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 752 
Suing an ambassador or 
foreign minister 
3 years, fine at 
court’s discretion n/a n/a 
Violation of safe conduct, 
or Violence to 
ambassador or minister 
3 years, fine at 
court’s discretion 3 years, fine 18 U.S.C. § 112 
Larceny on United States’ 
property or on the high 
seas 
4 times the value 
of goods, 39 
stripes 
5 years if more than 
$1,000; 1 year if 
$1,000 or less. 18 U.S.C. § 661 
Receiving stolen goods 
4 times the value 
of goods, 39 
stripes  
3 years if more than 
$1,000; 1 year if 
$1,000 or less. 18 U.S.C. § 662 
Bribery of a judge 
Fine and 
imprisonment at 
the discretion of 
the judge 
1 year if not willful; 5 
years if willful.  
18 U.S.C. §§ 
203 & 216 
 
 
